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THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION: 
A VIEW THROUGH THE CASE OF NICARAGUA V. THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA (1984 -1986) 
4 
"If mankind in its international relations has 
signally failed to achieve the rational good, it 
must either have been too stupid to understand 
that good or too wicked to pursue it." 1 
E.H. Carr 
1 Carr, Edward Hallett, The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919 - 1939 [London, Macmillan and Co., 1942], pg. 51 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
5 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis explores the principle of non-intervention of international law through a critical 
analysis of the judgements of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the intervention of the 
United States in Nicaragua in the 1980s. The critical analysis traces the line of argumentation 
followed by the Court, focusing on the arguments about the right of collective self-defence 
and the right to resort to counter-measures. Then, it analyses the behaviour of the parties and 
their motives, in order to obtain a wider perspective of the case, and its relation with the 
principle of non-intervention. 
The judgement of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the intervention of the United 
States in Nicaragua is a landmark in both international law and the study of illegal 
interventions, as it clarified the meaning and status of the principles of non-intervention and 
non-use of force. 2 Also, it was the first time that an international tribunal took on the task of 
examining the US foreign policies in the light of international law. 
The decisions of the ICJ can be approached formally or substantively. The judgement of 26 
November 1984, for instance, has to do with the jurisdiction of the Court and the admissibility 
of the application of Nicaragua. Although these formal matters were pivotal in establishing the 
grounds for the Court's jurisdiction and the admissibility of Nicaragua's lawsuit, we will only 
go through them briefly, as they draw primarily on procedural aspects that are not the main 
concern of this paper. Special attention will be thus given to the judgment of 27 June 1986, 
which dealt with the merits of the case or matters of substance. 
2 Hilarie, Max, International Law and the United States Military Intervention in the Western Hemisphere, [The 
Hague, Klwer Law International, 1997] pg. 19 
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Principle of non-intervention - an overview 
The first writer to state the principle explicitly was Christian Wolff in the year 1748.3 The 
tenet was formulated as a negative concept, that of non-intervention. But what is understood 
by intervention as a positive notion? Intervention has been defined as a "dictatorial or coercive 
interference, by an outside party or parties, in the sphere of jurisdiction of a sovereign State, or 
more broadly of an independent political community.,,4 
This definition contains several elements. The expression "dictatorial or coercive" implies 
that the intervener is usually superior in power than the intervened. The interference can be: 
direct, when performed by the intervener himself, or indirect, when an agent or proxy is used 
to carry it out; open, when undertaken with no secrecy, or clandestine, when the instruments 
employed are under the control of secret intelligence agencies; forcible, when it purports to the 
use of force, or non-forcible, when it takes the form of economic or diplomatic sanctions. The 
outside party or parties may be a State, a group of States, an international organization, a 
business corporation, or even a political party. And finally, the sovereign jurisdiction can be 
territorial, over the State's citizens, or over its right to determine its internal or external affairs. 
The core of the rule of non-intervention is the right of States to independence and sovereignty, 
and their equality in rights, no matter their size, status, or political ideology. Any dictatorial or 
coercive intervention is hence generally seen as legally and morally wrong. 5 The normative on 
non-intervention seeks to provide an acceptable balance between sovereignty of States and the 
interdependence oftoday's world. 6 
3 Wolff, Christian, Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum Trans. Joseph Drake, [Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1934], §2, in http://www.iep.utm.edu/i/interven.htm 
4 Bull, Hedley, Intervention in World Politics, [London, Oxford University Press, 1984] 
5 According to Paul Ramsey, the central issue in determining the morality of a particular intervention is whether 
:t serves justice or not. Instead, for Michael Walzer the criterion should be determined by the protection of 
territorial integrity and political sovereignty of all States. See Johnson, James, "Morality and Contemporary 
Warfare", in http://religion.rutgers.eciu/courses/347/readings/intervention.htmland Johnson James, "Thinking 
Morally about Intervention", in http://www.paccm.noIl999/2/intervensjon/johnson/ 
6 Higgins Rosalyn, "Intervention and International Law", in Bull, Intervention in World Politics, [London, 
Oxford University Press, 1984] pg. 30 
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Although acts aimed at influencing the domestic affairs of another State are illegitimate,7 it is 
rather difficult to determine the lawfulness or unlawfulness of intervention in the abstract. 
While military interventions that do not abide by the parameters established in the United 
Nations Charter are blatantly illegal, there are other kinds of interventions in which the picture 
is less clear. 
Some authors contend that the post-1945 period has been one of increased forcible 
interventions. Yet, as Hedley Bull asserts, what has increased is not the incidence or scale of 
interventions, but our perception of them as such. The establishment of the principle of non-
intervention as one of the pillars of international law has played an essential role in this change 
of perception. The changes reflected in the political organs of the UN also constitute "an 
important index of the shift that has taken place in the normative climate of intervention.,,8 
Article 2 of the UN Charter forbids the use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any State, as well as interventions in matters which are essentially within 
their domestic jurisdiction.9 Article 2-7 establishes: 
"Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the 
present Charter ... " 
However, the principle admits an exception: the application of enforcement measures under 
Chapter VII to maintain or restore international peace and security. Thus, while the use of 
armed force against the territorial integrity or political independence of States is generally 
prohibited, intervention is justifiable in certain cases: on the grounds of self-defence; upon 
invitation of the intervened; 10 when it is done to assist a State to repel another intervention, 
also known as counter-intervention; when it is collectively authorized by the international 
7 Hoffman, Stanley, "The Problem ofIntervention", in Bull, Intervention in World Politics, [London, Oxford 
University Press, 1984] pg. II 
8 Op. Cit. Bull, pg. 149 
9 UN Charter, Article 2 - 7 
10 In this sense, "a state's freedom to invite other states to undertake tasks within its sphere of jurisdiction is, 
i Ildeed, an aspect of its sovereignty." Op. Cit. Bull pg. 190 
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community itself through an international organization; II and when intervention is carried out 
for humanitarian reasons, commonly known as humanitarian intervention. 12 
According to some authors, the UN Charter is not satisfactory in its way of dealing with 
intervention, for it considers only certain types of actions, neglecting other forms of abusive 
interference. Additionally, Article 2-7 of the UN Charter prohibits intervention to the United 
Nations as a collective institution, but leaves a void when States are individually considered. 
With respect to the first issue, the Charter certainly bans the use of force and the threat of the 
use of force, but remains silent about more frequent types of intervention, such as the attempt 
to change the nature of a government, or to determine the outcome of a civil war. For this 
reason, Stanley Hoffman contends that the UN Charter is "based on a model which draws a 
sharp distinction between external and domestic affairs; the evil against which it is supposed 
to operate is the massive crossing of established borders by armies; and that has not been the 
main problem of post-war international relations.,,13 The IC}, however, does not consider this 
issue as a problem. In its viewpoint, "it was never intended that the Charter should embody 
written confirmation of every essential principle of international law in force. The existence in 
the opinio juris l4 of States of the principle of non-intervention is backed by established and 
substantial practice." 15 Bull agrees with this stance as, for him, a loose set of moral and 
political precepts, principles and precedents allow measuring the degree of legitimacy of a 
particular intervention. 
11 In regards to collective intervention, Evan Luard says: "Collective intervention C .•. ) is by definition intervention 
that has been authorized by some international body having widespread legitimacy C ••• ). Intervention by such an 
organization, duly authorized, is widely seen as proper, even desirable." Luard, Evan, "Collective Intervention", 
in Bull, Intervention in World Politics, [London, Oxford University Press, 1984] pg. 157 
12 Humanitarian interventions have become very problematic under the actual circumstances, because "it is hard 
to know whether an intervention which starts as a humanitarian move does not later become self-serving." Op. 
Cit. Hoffman, pg 24 
13 Ibid, pg. 21 
14 The latin expression opinio juris refers to the commonly shared opinion that a customary rule is binding for all 
States. In the Court's words, opinio juris is the "evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by 
the existence of a rule requiring it. The need for such a belief, i.e., the existence of a subjective element, is 
implicit in the very notion of the opinio juris sive necesitatis." Decision of the IC] of 27 June 1986, Case 
Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, pg. 109 
15 Ibid, pg. 106 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
9 
With regards to the second problem, the void left by the Charter concerning States being 
individually considered was resolved by later instruments of international law. The UN 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (1960)16 
established that "[a]ll States shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the Charter 
of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the present Declaration 
on the basis of equality, non-interference in the internal affairs of all States, and respect for 
the sovereign rights of all peoples and their territorial integrity." 17 
In the same manner, the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic 
Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty (1965), and the 
Declaration on Principles of International Law, Friendly Relations and Cooperation (1970) set 
out principles that were declared as the "basic principles" of international law. According to 
the former, 
"No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of 
measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the 
exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it advantages of any kind. Also, 
no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, 
terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the 
regime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in another State.,,18 
This text was reproduced in the Declaration on Principles of International Law, and 
accordingly the use of force constitutes a violation of international law. Therefore "States shall 
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any State.,,19 In addition, the Declaration proclaims that 
16 See the Declaration on the Granting ofIndependence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, in 
http://www.unhchr.ch/htmllmen1l3/b/ccoloni.htm 
17 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, Article 7. The highlight is 
ours. 
18 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States, in 
http://daccessdds.l1n.orgldoc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NRO/21S/94/1MGiNR02IS94.pdf?OpenElement. Highlight is 
ours. 
19 Declaration on Principles of International Law, Friendly Relations and Cooperation 
http://www.hku.edll/law/eonlawhk/eonlaw/outlinc/Outline4/2625.htm 
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every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in 
acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State.20 
Despite the prohibition of intervention in various declarations, conventions and resolutions, its 
practice has been conspicuous in international relations.2! However, as Hedley Bull notes, our 
perception of it as unlawful has become more acute. This has been reflected in the values and 
standards of behaviour consecrated in international law by the "international society". Respect 
for that society and the individuality of each one of its members, is precisely what is behind 
the topic of non-intervention, and is, ultimately, what this thesis will seek to endorse. 
Delimitation of the topic 
There are many kinds of interventions (humanitarian intervention, intervention in self-defence, 
military intervention, economic or diplomatic sanctions, etc.), and each of them has an 
associated debate of its own. The paper will concentrate on intervention involving the use of 
force, with the objective of manipulating the outcome of an internal conflict of another State. 
The "use of force", as forbidden by the UN Charter, targets the use of armed force through 
military or paramilitary actions against another State. 22 The paper will draw on issues related 
to the principle of non-use of force that have a direct impact on the arguments on non-
intervention. 
20 Ibid 
21 See Gurtov, Melvin, The United States against the Third World, Antinationalism and Intervention, [New York, 
Praeger Publishers, 1974]. In the case of the United States, One only has to recall Eisenhower's policies in the 
Middle East, Kennedy's in Africa, Johnson's in Latin America and Asia, Nixon's in Asia, Reagan's in Central 
America, Clinton's in the Middle East, Africa and the Balkans, and Bush father and son in, again, the Middle 
East. See Ibid, and Johnson, Loch K., Secret Agencies, U.S. Intelligence in a Hostile World, [New York, Yale 
University Press, 1996] 
22 See Clark Arendt, Anthony, "International Law and the Preemptive Use of Military Force", in 
http://www.twg.com/03spring/docs/03spring arend.pdf. See also Diaz Barrado, Castor Miguel, "La Prohibici6n 
del Uso de la Fuerza en el Derecho Internacional Contemponineo. Un caso pnictico: la Operaci6n Armada de los 
Estados Unidos de America en la Republica Arabe de Libia. Abril de 1986", in 
http://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaim1?codigo= 124632 
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:\1 ethodology 
This paper will consist of a critical analysis of the judgements of the IC] concerning the case 
of Nicaragua v. the United States, and the behaviour and motives of the parties involved. 
Critical analysis here provides a method that focuses on the strengths, weaknesses, and context 
of argumentation. The word "critical" entails an evaluation or subjective appraisal of the 
argument. The word "analysis" represents the breaking down or study of its parts. In this 
regard, a critical analysis thus considers the claims of theorists, academics, governments, 
jurists, etc. on a certain topic, seeking to determine their basis, and the extent to which they 
apply to a given situation. 
Through the evaluation of primary and secondary literature, we will break down the arguments 
to find their logic, and determine the influence of historical events and political contexts in the 
parties' decisions. The method will provide a better understanding of the case, and will help to 
conclude on its coherency, relevance, and applicability. 
The thesis will be divided into two parts. Part one will concentrate on the primary sources, that 
is, the judgments of the ICJ. Through a careful and thorough reading, it will bring about the 
logic of the Court's reasoning, and the necessity of its conclusions. The claims of the Court 
will be critically assessed, splitting them up into their component parts (main premise, minor 
premise and conclusion), with the purpose of establishing the strengths and weaknesses of the 
argumentation. Understandably, Part one will draw on juridical aspects, as the objects of study 
are the judgements themselves. The analysis will trace the substantive arguments behind the 
procedural explanations and factual descriptions - as the core line of reasoning of the IC] is 
dispersed throughout the judgments - and will determine their internal coherence. 
The arguments in this part will be twofold: on the one hand, the paper will examine the 
dismissal of the justification of collective self-defence, and how this led the Court to conclude 
that the principle of non-use of force had been infringed by the United States. On the other, it 
will assess the dismissal of the justification of the right to take counter-measures, and how this 
entailed the violation of the principle of non-intervention. 
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Part two will deal with the political aspects of the case, through an interdisciplinary approach 
combining historical antecedents, international law, and international relations theory. The 
parties' behaviour and their motives will be appraised, using primary and secondary literature. 
The criteria of judgment underlying the study are the following: are the Court's arguments 
incontestable, or do they, on the contrary, show flaws and shortcomings? If so, do the flaws 
undermine the legitimacy and validity of the judgements? Are the arguments used to rule the 
Nicaragua case obsolete? Is the illegality of intervention determined by the absence of 
justifying arguments? Are the doctrines that inform US foreign policy compatible with 
international law? What was the real motivation behind the actions of the United States, 
Nicaragua, Honduras, Costa Rica and EI Salvador? Does the recurring disrespect of the rule of 
non-intervention imply that the customary rule has changed, and so must the system? 
Responses to possible objections 
The topic of the thesis might face some objections worth addressing in advance, in order to 
circumvent the readers' veto. Firstly, talking about the principle of non-intervention in the 
actual circumstances of world politics might seem like a mockery, as we witness numerous 
interventions in the internal affairs of weaker States with all kinds of excuses. As Phillip 
Windsor puts it, "a general assumption persists of a world so dominated, indeed permeated, by 
sheer power that it becomes almost futile to discuss the question of intervention by the 
superpowers ... ,,23 But perhaps, even though violations to the non-interventionist rule are 
indeed evident and manifest, compliance with it passes unnoticed. Surely, if the principle did 
not exist in customary international law, intromissions in other States' affairs would be much 
more frequent. As long as the rule remains valid, only powerful States can afford to interfere 
in weaker States. 
23 Windsor, Philip, "Superpower Intervention", in Bull, Intervention in World Politics, [London, Oxford 
University Press, 1984], pg.45 
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In addition, exploring the issue of non-intervention is, in the same way as the analysis of any 
moral principle, never obsolete. Although intervention has been conspicuous throughout 
modem history, this does not take from the fact that there is a need to find out whether the 
foundations of international law survive as principles, or whether they have changed, 
providing impetus for the law to change as well. 
Some might pose a second and more profound objection that casts doubts over the very heart 
of international law itself. International legislation is the result of the consensus reached by 
international actors on the norms that should direct their relations. The fact that there is no 
supranational authority that can enforce international law has led many lawyers and theorists 
to question its juridical character,24 arguing that international law cannot be classified as a 
proper system of law. If this is the case, it is legitimate to ask: what is the real relevance and 
applicability of international law and its institutions, the Ie] being one of them? Are they 
really operative, or are they just a decorative figure in the landscape of international relations? 
H.L.A. Hart postulates a strong argument in support of the juridical and, therefore, compulsory 
character of international law. He explains that a system of law is not only composed of 
primary rules, or norms supported by threats of sanctions, but also of secondary rules, like the 
norms that grant the faculty to create, modify or terminate duties and obligations. Wherever 
there are juridical rules, be they primary, secondary, or both, there is a legal system that makes 
conduct compulsory.25 The lack of a unified system of sanctions does not entail the invalidity 
of international law; it only denotes that international law is constituted mainly by secondary 
rules. The juridical character of international law is supported by the fact that sovereign 
political entities are bound by superior constraining rules, which must be obeyed if their 
purpose is to create legal obligations. 
Hans Kelsen also argued in favour of the classification of international law as "law", stating 
that international law is such, precisely because it authorises counter-intervention, that is, that 
the victim of an unlawful act takes justice into its own hands. Thus, "[f]ear of being exposed 
24 Hart, H.L.A., "International Law", in The Concept of Law. [Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994] 
25 Hart, H.L.A., El Concepto de Derecho, [Buenos Aires, Ed. Abeledo Perrot, 1995] pg. 102 
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to counter-measures may act as a powerful inducement to abide by commitments undertaken 
by States. ,,26 
An additional argument in favour of compliance with international law is based on its moral 
character. Gordon Graham expressed it in these words: "international law deserves the respect 
of those subject to it, not because they can be forced to obey it, but because it embodies the 
moral rights of nations.,,27 Indeed, the moral content of international law, which is clear and 
apparent, constitutes a strong argument in favour of the binding nature of international rules. 
However, this argument is highly debatable and far from convincing for positivists and 
realists. Hence, it is important to stress that there are norms, such as those regulating territorial 
issues or procedural matters, which do not involve any moral content, and must nevertheless 
be obeyed by international actors. The binding nature of these norms is independent from their 
moral character. 
Thirdly, it is possible to contend that the case study is only applicable within the bipolar 
context of the Cold War. Notwithstanding, the answer to this contention is straightforward: the 
arguments used to rule the Nicaragua case have permanent validity, because they are based on 
customary international rules that have remained the same since the Cold War. The treaty-law 
invoked constitutes the backbone of the current international law and inter-American relations, 
i.e., the United Nations Charter and the Charter of the Organization of American States, and 
the judgments served to clarify them. In addition, the doctrines and values that have inspired 
US foreign policy for years are still adduced today to justify interventions around the globe. 
Hence, although the political background has certainly changed, the grounds to carry out 
interventions (i.e. the protection of the national interest, the need to spread democracy, the 
need to protect freedom everywhere) remain the same. The topic is therefore important, useful, 
and up to date. 
26 Tomuschat, Christian, "Are counter-measures subject to prior recourse to dispute settlement procedures?", 
European Journal of International law, in http://www.ejil.orgjjournallYoI5/Nol!art8.pdf 
27 Graham, Gordon, Ethics and International Relations, [Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1997], pg. 95. Counter-
measures, a central argument in the Nicaragua case, constitute an exception to the principle of non-intervention. 
They are actions taken in response to an initial wrongful act by another State. If the wrongful act does not exist, 
the measures taken as a supposed retaliation purport an infringement of the customary rule of non-intervention. 
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Structure of the thesis 
With these basic premises in mind, the structure of the paper will be the following: Part I will 
study the judgments, drawing on juridical aspects of the case that are indispensable for a better 
understanding of the Court's reasoning. It will comprise three chapters: Chapter I will briefly 
go through the historical context and the facts of the case; Chapter II will concentrate on the 
analysis of the arguments used by the Court to dismiss US allegations i.e. the exercise of the 
right of collective self defence, the lack of an armed attack by Nicaragua against its 
neighbours, and the possibility to justify US actions based on the right to take counter-
measures; and finally, Chapter III will make some comments on the judgment of 27 June 
1986, particularly with regards to the concept of "armed attack" and the right to resort to 
counter-measures. 
Part II will assess the behaviour of the parties and their motives under a more political scope, 
to finally draw corresponding conclusions. 
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PART I 
- THE JUDGEMENTS -
Generally speaking, the judgements of the ICJ are critical in the development of international 
law. The Court's decisions really influence the attitude of States towards other international 
actors, and they clarify the notions and principles that guide international relations. 
The role of the ICJ has its origins in the first Permanent Court of Arbitration created in The 
Hague Peace Convention of 1899.28 Later on, the League of Nations brought into being the 
Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), to hear and determine disputes of 
international character, and to give advisory opinions upon any dispute or question referred to 
it by the Councilor the Assembly. After the Second World War, the San Francisco 
Conference (1945) decided in favour of the creation of an entirely new court, the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ), which would be the principal judicial organ of the United Nations 
(UN). The Statute of the ICJ forms an integral part of the UN Charter. Hence, "by signing the 
Charter, a State Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with any decision of the 
International Court of Justice in a case to which it is a party.,,29 
The ICJ works as a "world court" to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with 
the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international 
disputes that might lead to a breach of the peace (Article 1 UN Charter). The jurisdiction of 
the Court comprises all cases referred to it by the parties, and all matters specially provided for 
in the UN Charter or in treaties and conventions in force. 3o Thus, the ICJ is competent to solve 
disputes between States that have made a "special agreement" to recognize the ICJ's 
jurisdiction over that particular case, or conflicts where no previous agreement has been made. 
In this case, States may declare they recognize as compulsory ipso facto the jurisdiction of the 
Court, in relation to any other State accepting the same obligation, in legal disputes concerning 
28 See General Information on the ICJ in http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwwwligeneralinfonnationlibleubook.pdf 
29 Ibid, pg. 75 
30 Statute of the International Court of Justice, in http://www.icj-
cij .orglicj w\vwlibasicdocumentslibasictextlibasicstatutc.htm#CHAPTER II 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
17 
the following: the interpretation of a treaty; any question of international law; the existence of 
any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation; the 
nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation. 
States can have reservations to the acceptances of the compulsory jurisdiction. The 
judgements of the Court are binding, final and without appeal as far as the parties to the case 
are concerned. 
Although the principle of stare decisis, whereby courts are bound by precedents, does not 
apply in international law, the Ie] maintains a certain consistency in its decisions. This 
enables it to influence the attitude of States towards questions that have already been dealt 
with, thus deriving guidance from the principles laid down by its judgements.31 For this 
reason, "a judgement of the Court does not simply decide a particular dispute, but inevitably 
also contributes to the development of international law.,,32 There lies the importance of the 
ICJ's decisions, and the reason why these particular judgements have been chosen as objects 
of study in this paper. 
31 Ibid, pg. 76 
32 Ibid 
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Chapter I 
- Facts of the case concerning military and paramilitary 
activities in and against Nicaragua -
Historical context 
18 
The intervention of the United States in Nicaragua took place under the bipolar structure of the 
Cold War, characterized by the ideological contest between capitalism and communism. The 
Brezhnev doctrine legitimized intervention so long as fundamental communist principles were 
at stake. 33 The United States, on the other hand, claimed a right to intervene in order to protect 
other countries from the threat of communism. The two countries capable of waging a nuclear 
war were forced to ensure that conflicts taking place around the world would not lead to an 
all-out confrontation between East and West. 34 
In this context, revolutionary struggles became a critical arena, because they appeared to have 
a direct impact on regional and global power balances. 35 Thus, while the Soviet Union tried to 
spread communist ideals in weak new emerging nations, the United States strived to protect 
those regimes against the "predatory effects of communist-inspired and supported guerrilla 
warfare".36 The endorsement of counter-insurgency policies was one of the tools used for this 
purpose. Communism was not only philosophically hostile to US ideology, but also 
detrimental to its national interests. 
After the failure in Vietnam, the United States retreated from counter-insurgency activism. 
Nixon declared the United States would give sympathy and support to those fighting against 
communism, but would henceforth abstain from providing combatants. Nevertheless, the 
33 Op. Cit. pg. 55 
34 Ibid, pg. 51 
35 Morgenthau, Hans, "To Intervene or not to Intervene", in 
http://dss.ucsd.edu/-bslantch/courses/nss/documents/morgenthau-to-intervene.pdf 
36 Op. Cit Hoffman, pg. 120 
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revolutionary developments of the 1970S37 revived the interventionary approach to political 
struggles taking place in strategic regions of the world, such as the Middle East and Central 
America. This political climate led the United States to revisit the Monroe Doctrine, "America 
for the Americans", engaging in several interventions in places such as Nicaragua, Guatemala 
(1954), Cuba (1961), the Dominican Republic (1965), Chile (1973), and Grenada (1983). 
The case in point IS umque because, unlike in other countries, Nicaragua was able to 
circumvent the US veto in the Security Council, as well as its influence in the Organization of 
American States (OAS), by referring the dispute directly to the ICJ. The case raised 
fundamental questions of both law and politics, particularly with regards to the principles of 
non-intervention and non-use of force. Also, for the first time, US foreign policy and its 
relationship to Latin America were examined by an international tribunal. 
Developments in Nicaragua 
The United States supported 42 years of dictatorship of the right-wing Somoza family in 
Nicaragua. The abuses committed by the Somozas 38 led to the Sandinista39 revolution, which 
ended up with the victory of the Frente Sandinista de Liberaci6n Nacional4o (FSLN) in 1979. 
When the Sandinista revolutionary forces overthrew Dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle,41 
the Organization of American States (OAS) adopted a resolution declaring the need for the 
immediate and definitive replacement of the Somoza regime, the installation of a democratic 
]7 For instance, the dispatch of Cuban troops to Angola and Ethiopia to consolidate Marxist-Leninist victories, the 
revolutions in Iran and Nicaragua, and the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan to repress the anti-regime 
uprising. 
38 Anastasio Somoza Garcia had himself fraudulently elected president in 1937. He ruled as dictator for the next 
20 years, sometimes as president, sometimes behind a puppet president. He was assassinated in 1956. His elder 
son Luis replaced him until his death in 1967, when the younger son, Anastasio Somoza Debayle, assumed the 
presidency. In http://berclo.netipageOI/Olen-nicaragua.html It was well known that, referring to the first General 
Somoza and his installation in power in 1933, an officer of President Franklin Roosevelt's administration said: 
"He may be a son of a bitch, but he's our son of a bitch !". Reichler Paul S., "Holding America to its own best 
standards: Abe Chayes and Nicaragua in the World Court", in http://www.fhe.com/ 
39 The word Sandinista comes from Augusto Nicolas Calderon Sandino, better known as Augusto Cesar Sandino. 
Born in 1895 in a small village in Nicaragua, he became a leftist revolutionary, who fought against the United 
States' interventions in Nicaragua from 1856 onwards. He was killed by members of the National Guard of 
Dictator Anastasio Somoza Garcia on 21 February 1934. 
40 In English, Sandinist National Liberation Front. 
41 See "Nicaragua: una historia tormentosa", in http://www.nod050.org/espanicalhistonica.html#somozas 
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government, and the holding of free elections in Nicaragua. The FSLN installed a Junta of 
National Reconstruction, and an I8-member government composed almost completely by 
members of the FSLN. 
Under Jimmy Carter's presidency, the attitude of the United States towards the Sandinistas 
was "to treat the new regime with a show of goodwill,,42, approving emergency food aid and 
economic assistance.43 However, when President Reagan took office in January 1981 this aid 
was suspended. The Reagan administration justified this suspension by arguing that the new 
Nicaraguan government was not only receiving support from the Soviets, but was also 
assisting the insurgents in El Salvador. In order to oppose the spread of communist regimes in 
Central America, the United States started funding the right-wing counter-revolutionary 
groups formed by ex-soldiers of the Somoza National Guard. They were called the Contras.44 
Reagan's policies towards Nicaragua, and Central America in general, were an application of 
both the Monroe Doctrine and the Truman Doctrine of Containment (implemented in 1947)45. 
The latter included four main tenets: prevention, alliance, intervention, and free trade. 
Strategic prevention was conceived as a way of using the threat of nuclear weapons to deter 
the Soviet Union from launching an attack against the United States and its allies. The system 
of alliances consisted of the creation of a Western block that would be protected by nuclear 
weapons from any Soviet aggression. The use of intervention served to establish US forces in 
developing countries, in order to extend the US area of influence. Finally, all these instruments 
would guarantee a safe environment for free trade between the United States and its allies, 
which supposedly increased the financial power of the Western hegemony. 
42 Draper, Theodore, A Very Thin Line, The Iran-Contra Affairs, [New York, Hill and Wang, 1991] pg. 16 
~o The show of good will of the Carter administration came after efforts had failed to maintain the Somoza's 
system intact. In this sense, Noam Chomsky says: "When (Somoza's) rule was challenged by the Sandinistas in 
the late I 970s, the US first tried to institute what was called "Somocismo [Somoza-ism] without Somoza" - that 
is, the whole corrupt system intact, but with somebody else at the top. That didn't work, so President Carter tried 
to maintain Somoza's National Guard as a base for US power. ( ... )The Carter administration flew Guard 
commanders out of the country in planes with Red Cross markings (a war crime), and began to reconstitute the 
Guard on Nicaragua's borders." Chomsky, Noam, "Teaching Nicaragua a Lesson", in 
http://www.zmag.org/chomsky/sam/sam-2-03.htm I 
44 "Contra" in Spanish means "against". 
45 See Sanders, Jerry, "Reaganismo y Economia Mundial", Rakes de la Politica Norteamericana hacia Nicaragua, 
[Managua, Cuademos de pensamiento propio, 1987] 
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Thus, the rationale behind Reagan's foreign policy turned on the containment of communism 
through various instruments, with one of them being the use of covert operations.46 These have 
been defined as the use of aggressive clandestine actions abroad, undertaken to oppose the 
nation's adversaries.47 With the aid of the United States, opposition bands against the new 
"democratic coalition government" of Nicaragua were organized into two main groups: the 
Fuerza Democnitica Nicaragiiense (FDN),48 a trained fighting force that started operating in 
1981 along the borders with Honduras, and the Alianza Revolucionaria Democnitica 
(ARDE),49 which started its activities in 1982 operating along the borders with Costa Rica. 
Both the FDN and ARDE constituted the Contras. 
The initial activities of these groups were financed with funds from the CIA made available 
for covert action. The size of the insurgent groups increased notably with this financial 
assistance: from an initial body of five hundred men in December 1981, the Contras turned 
into a force of twelve thousand men by November 1983. Although the operations were at the 
beginning undisclosed, it did not take long before their actions became public. 
In 1983, the US Congress made specific provIsIOn for funds to be used by intelligence 
agencies in the direct or indirect support of military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua. 
The US administration alleged that the Sandinistas were expanding their defensive scope by 
supporting outbursts of violence in the region, thus posing a great threat to neighbouring 
countries, namely, EI Salvador5o, Honduras, and Costa Rica. The feeling was that the Soviets 
46 Benitez, Raul; Lozano, Lucrecia; Bermudez, Lilia, Estados Unidos contra Nicaragua, la guerra de baja 
intensidad en Centroamerica, [Madrid, Ed. Revoluci6n, 1987] pg. 53. 
47 Op. Cit. Loch Johnson, pg ix. 
48 In English, Democratic Nicaraguan Force 
40 In English, Democratic Revolutionary Alliance 
50 The Sandinista movement in Nicaragua and the armed opposition in El Salvador shared their ideology. EI 
Salvador had gone through long years of repressive right-winged dictatorship by the National Conciliation Party, 
and there was great social discontent due to the outstanding inequalities, the poverty and the dreadful state of the 
Salvadorian economy. When civil war erupted between the government and the leftist guerrilla units, the United 
States intervened in support of the military dictatorship. The war in EI Salvador lasted for 12 years. 
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and their allies were engaged in a program of cultural influence, which was beginning to yield 
strategic results in the area. 51 
Although the US Congress was willing to prevent the flow of arms from Nicaragua to E1 
Salvador, it opposed the executive's determination to overthrow the Sandinista government. 
Thus the CIA and the Department of Defence were proscribed from funding or providing 
military training to the Contras. Only humanitarian assistance, by way of provision of food, 
clothing and medicines, was approved. Nevertheless, even though Congress proscribed 
financial aid to the Contras, the Reagan administration developed different sources of funding 
to keep financing the insurgents. At first, the financial and military assistance was provided 
through private sources and third countries. Later on, it was supplied with profits from sales of 
arms to Iran, which needed the weapons to fight its war against Iraq. These covert operations 
became known as the Iran-contra affairs. 
Iran-Contra affairs 
By the time Reagan came to power, there were differing opinions on the issue of covert 
actions between members of the legislative and members of the administration. For example, 
the tasks and functions of the National Security Council (NSC) were not clearly established, 
and the trust placed by the president in the National Security Adviser and the Secretary of 
State created a strong rivalry between their positions. In addition, the Vietnam fiasco, the Bay 
of Pigs debacle, and US involvement in Chile's coup had led Congress to take several 
measures to deal with covert operations. The president was required to present "findings" on 
covert activities - that is, reports with the president's signature describing the need and nature 
of covert operations52 -, and the president was obligated by the Intelligence Oversight Act to 
give prior notice to the congressional intelligence committees of any significant intelligence 
activity, including covert operations. As a result, Reagan in fact codified the entire intelligence 
51 MarceJla, Gabriel, "Security, Democracy, and Development: The United States & Latin America in the Next 
Decade", in http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.millairchronicles/aureview/1986/jul-aug/marcella.html 
52 Op. Cit. Draper pg. 14 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
23 
system, ascribing the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with direct responsibility for covert 
activities. 
The intervention in Nicaragua generated further disputes within the US government. Although 
Congress was willing to support the interdiction of armament flows from Nicaragua to EI 
Salvador, it was against the initiative of the executive to overthrow the Sandinistas. The 
executive, on the other hand - namely President Reagan, the director of the CIA William 
Casey, and National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane -, was determined to undermine the 
Nicaraguan government, and to give full support to the counter-revolutionary movement. S3 
Despite the obligation to give prior notice to the congressional intelligence committees of any 
significant intelligence activity, the congressional committees, to which the CIA was now 
supposed to report, only knew as much as the CIA chose to tell them, or "what they read in the 
newspapers."S4 Hence, the House Select Committee on Intelligence was outraged when it 
became known that financial aid was being directed to weaken the Sandinista government. 
Efforts were immediately directed to cut off the funds for the Nicaraguan resistance. The 
Boland I amendment (1983) prohibited the CIA and the Department of Defence from using 
any funds to overthrow the Nicaraguan regime. In breach of this provision, the CIA secretly 
placed magnetic mines in several Nicaraguan ports with Reagan's authorization. This crisis of 
trust between Congress and the executive branch then brought about Boland II (1984), which 
proscribed any military or paramilitary support for the Contras for the period of October 1984 
to December 1985. 
Despite these frictions, the government was determined to keep the Contras together "body 
and soul". Since the CIA and the Department of Defence were banned by the Boland 
amendments from directing resources to the empowerment of the Contras, the task of raising 
the funds and keeping support for the insurgents alive was given to members of the NSC staff. 
In Robert McFarlane's terms: 
53 See Sorensen, Theodore C. "The President and the Secretary of State", Foreign Affairs, Winter 1987/88 
54 Op. Cit. Draper, pg. 15 
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"Congressional restrictions made it impractical for either the Defence Department 
or the Central Intelligence Agency to function even as a liaison with the Contras. 
The State Department had always been disinclined to be associated with a covert 
action. But the President had made it clear that he wanted a job done. The net 
result was that the job fell to the National Security Council staff.,,55 
24 
Yet, the 'job" was not assigned to the whole of the NSC staff, but to one specific person, 
Oliver North, appointed as the sole contact of the United States government with the 
Nicaraguan insurgents. North was a marine officer who became infamous for orchestrating a 
master plan of covert operations to keep funding the Contras, regardless of Congress' 
prohibitions. With the guidance of the CIA's director William Casey, he initially arranged that 
the financing for the rebels came from third countries, namely Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, Brunei 
and South Korea, as well as from private contributions. Later on, the United States diverted 
profits from arms sales to Iran, who in tum was waging war against Iraq, to the Contras. 
The Iran affair began with the abduction of seven North American citizens, who were taken 
hostage in Lebanon by presumably pro- Iranian Shiite groups, between 1984 and 1985. Before 
these events took place, the United States had launched an international campaign known as 
Operation Staunch, to prevent arms sales to Iran because the Ayatollah Khomeini's regime 
was accused of supporting international terrorism. The abduction of the Americans in 
Lebanon, however, forced the US administration to re-examine its position towards Iran, as it 
was suggested that the abducted citizens could be traded for weapons. In 1985, an agreement 
was reached whereby Israel would serve as mediator between the United States and Iran, to 
sell US-made arms to the latter. Iran, in tum, would intercede with the Hezbollah kidnappers 
for the liberation of the hostages. Reagan's conscience was in this way eased by the thought 
that the United States was not selling the arms directly. 56 Yet, the "arms-for-hostages" deal 
was doomed to failure. The strategy of trading arms for hostages required that there were 
hostages to be traded, thus, releasing all those kidnapped was not convenient for Iran, as long 
as arms could be acquired in return for hostages. This was proven by the first Israel-Iran 
transaction of arms for one hostage. 
55 Ibid, pg. 34 
56 Ibid, pg. 159 
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The Iran policy created an irreconcilable split in Reagan's administration. While the 
Secretaries of State and Defence did not support the arms deals with Iran, the director of the 
CIA and the National Security Adviser regarded the arms trade as the only way to save the 
hostages, and to achieve a change in Iran's government. Hence, President Reagan gave the 
latter total control of US foreign policy in this regard. John M. Poindexter, the National 
Security Adviser who took over from Robert McFarlane, and Oliver North, were appointed to 
handle both the Iran and Contra affairs at the same time, but it was "Ollie" North who 
ultimately decided that the residual funds from the sale of arms to Iran should be diverted to 
the Contra operation. 
This decision constituted the meeting point of the Iran and Contra affairs, which were, as 
Draper notes, separate and independent matters. According to North, the residual funds would 
be "used to purchase critically needed supplies for the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance 
Forces. This materiel is essential to cover shortages in resistance inventories resulting from 
their current offensives and Sandinista counter-attacks ... ,,57 Even though Poindexter was 
informed of the diversion of Iran funds for the Contras, it was alleged that President Reagan 
was never consulted on this critical issue. 
Thus, for almost two years, vital information was kept from the oversight committees in both 
the Senate and the House of Representatives, with the excuse that the CIA was the only 
agency legally charged with conducting covert activities, and therefore the only one that could 
be called to respond before Congress. President Reagan considered the NSC staff to be his 
personal staff and thereby, according to the doctrine of the separation of powers, exempt from 
congressional oversight. 58 Moreover, by accusing the Sandinistas of having links with Gadafi 
in Libya, the US Congress was persuaded to approve $500 million more in military and 
humanitarian aid to the Contras in 1986. 
57 Ibid, pg. 302 
58 Ibid, pg. 342 
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Nevertheless, SuspIcIOns on the NSC staff's activities and the CIA's conmvance were 
increasing, and later on this was confirmed by an incident that occurred to a plane sent to re-
supply a Contra group located in northern Nicaragua. The aircraft was shot down and one 
member of the crew, a US citizen, was captured by the Sandinistas. Washington denied any 
connection with the plane at the Iran-contra congressional hearings, but this episode inevitably 
began to unravel the entire operation. The "diversion memorandum", in which North 
expressed his intentions of directing the residual funds to the Contras in Nicaragua, was 
disclosed, and the whole deal spawned a major political crisis. The public opinion and the 
American media were shocked by the revelation that "the administration had been saying one 
thing publicly and doing the opposite clandestinely."s9 The concealment of information was 
based on the concept of "plausible deniability" of covert operations, explained by Draper in 
the following terms: 
"[b]y their very nature covert operations make it possible to put the good name or 
best interests of the country in such jeopardy that the only way to escape from the 
cost of failure or exposure is the ability to deny that they ever happened or to put 
the blame on someone else. ,,60 
In the case in point, US officials involved in the Iran-contra affairs tried to blame it all on 
Israel. Nevertheless, it was obvious that Israel had been just a mediator to "get the job done", 
as North, McFarlane and Poindexter put it. 
United States' activities in and against Nicaragua 
As mentioned above, US support to the Contras also included the mining of Nicaraguan ports 
or waters in order to close or restrict their access. Between February and April 1984, a total of 
12 vessels and fishing boats from different nationalities were destroyed or damaged by mines, 
two people were killed, and 14 wounded. On 10 April 1984, it was announced that President 
59 Ibid, pg. 470 
60 Ibid, pg. 561 
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Reagan had approved the mining. 61 According to press reports, the mines were fabricated by 
the CIA, with the help of a United States Navy Laboratory. They were laid on the sea-bed and 
triggered either acoustically, magnetically, by contact or by water pressure. The Soviet 
government accused the United States of being responsible for the mining. Likewise, the 
British Government manifested that it deplored the mining "as a matter of principle.,,62 As a 
result of the mining of ports, there was a rise in marine insurance rates for cargo to and from 
Nicaragua. In addition, some shipping companies stopped sending vessels to Nicaraguan 
harbours. 
US officials were also involved in the perpetration of attacks on ports and oil installations in 
late 1983 and early 1984. These acts were committed either directly by US military personnel, 
or by "UCLAS", Unilaterally Controlled Latino Assets, who were persons paid by, or acting 
on the direct instructions of US military or intelligence personnel. US aircraft also performed 
over-flights in Nicaraguan airspace, in order to supply the Contras, gather intelligence 
information, and intimidate the civilian population. 
The "UCLAS" made several attacks, inter alia, the blowing up of several underwater oil 
pipelines and part of the oil terminal at Puerto Sandino,63 an attack to the port of Corinto, 
which involved the destruction of five oil storage tanks, the loss of a great amount of fuel, and 
the displacement of a large part of the local population,64 an attack using rockets against the 
Potosi Naval Base,65 and several clashes between speed boats of mine-laying operations and 
Nicaraguan patrol boats.66 US agents participated in the planning, direction, support and 
execution of the operations. In order to carry out these attacks, a "mother ship" was supplied 
by the CIA, as well as speedboats, guns and ammunition. Helicopters were piloted by both 
Nicaraguans and US nationals. Along with Honduras, military manoeuvres were carried on 
Honduran territory, near the Nicaragua/Honduras frontier. The manoeuvres included the 
61 Decision of the ICJ of26 November 1986, Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against 
Nicaragua, pg. 47 
62 Ibid 
63 On 13 September 1983, Ibid 
64 On 10 October 1983, Ibid 
65 On 5 January 1984, Ibid 
00 Between 28 and 30 March 1984 
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patrolling of warships of the Nicaraguan coasts, both Atlantic and Pacific, troop movements 
and paratrooper exercises. 
The CIA further prepared manuals about guerrilla warfare, which were distributed among the 
Contra fighters in 1983. The most significant was entitled "Operaciones sicol6gicas en guerra 
de guerrillas,,,67 printed in several editions, and used to train middle-level commanders. The 
manual had sections manifestly opposed to humanitarian law. For example, one called 
"Implicit and Explicit Terror" gave directions on how to destroy military and police 
installations by cutting lines of communication, kidnapping officials, and the eventual need to 
fire on citizens if there was a risk of informing the enemy. There was a chapter on the 
"Selective Use of Violence for Propagandistic Effects", which explained how to "neutralize" 
selected and planned targets, such as judges, police forces and State officials. In the section on 
"Control of mass concentrations and meetings", it was stated: 
"if possible, professional criminals will be hired to carry out specific selective jobs 
( ... ) Specific tasks will be assigned to others, in order to create a 'martyr' for the 
cause taking demonstrators to a confrontation with the authorities, in order to bring 
about uprisings or shootings, which will cause the death of one or more persons, 
who would become the martyrs, a situation that should be made use of 
immediately against the regime.,,68 
According to the Intelligence Committee of Congress, the manual proved the lack of 
organization of the CIA, but not an intentional violation of the executive orders. 
A series of economic measures were also implemented against Nicaragua. Economic aid was 
halted in 1981; the United States put pressure on the Bank for International Reconstruction 
and Development and the Inter-American Development Bank to oppose or block loans to 
Nicaragua; the quota for sugar imports from Nicaragua was reduced by 90 per cent; and a total 
trade embargo was declared on Nicaragua on 1 May 1985. The President of the United States 
declared a "national emergency" created by the policies of Nicaragua towards other Central 
American States, and proclaimed an executive order of embargo, barring Nicaraguan vessels 
67 In English, Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare. 
68 Op. Cit. Decision of the IC] of 27 June 1986, pg. 66 
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from US ports, excluding Nicaraguan aircraft from air transportation to and from the United 
States, and prohibiting all imports from and exports to that country. 
As a result of the judicial process, the Court ruled against the United States, but the United 
States refused to abide by the judgments. Unable to get the Security Council to enforce the 
decision of the ICl, Nicaragua turned to the General Assembly. On 3 November 1986, the 
Assembly adopted a Resolution recommending that the United States comply with the ruling. 
This decision was also ignored. In view of this outcome, Nicaragua then filed new suits 
against Honduras and Costa Rica. In response, Oscar Arias, President of Costa Rica, 
committed himself to search for peace between the Central American countries, and to prevent 
Nicaragua from filing its new application in the ICl. To that end, he created the "Arias Plan" 
to bring peace in and between Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador.69 
This plan led to his award of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1987 and President Ortega agreed to 
withdraw the lawsuit against Costa Rica, and the suspension of the suit against Honduras. The 
Sandinistas and the Contras finally agreed to a cease-fire in March 1988, and free elections 
were held in Nicaragua on February 1990.70 
69 The "Arias Plan" included: the termination of all support to irregular forces in the region, and the prohibition to 
use any territory in Central America by irregular forces to attack another State; the holding of direct talks 
between governments and irregular forces in Nicaragua, EI Salvador, and Guatemala, and the negotiation of a 
cease-fire; the direct negotiations between governments and opposition groups to eliminate the restrictions on 
civil liberties and set the conditions for democratic elections; the downsizing of armed forces to levels 
appropriate just for defence; and finally, the signing of peace agreements among all five countries of the region. 
70 The Sandinistas were defeated by Violeta Chamorro's coalition. George H. Bush Sr., who had been Reagan's 
vice-president, offered Nicaragua substantial assistance to help reconstruct the country. Chamorro chose a 
friendly relationship with the United States, rather than pursuing the reparations demand in the IC] unlikely to be 
ever satisfied. Thus, Nicaragua's request for reparations was withdrawn from the Court in 1991, marking the end 
of all proceedings of Nicaragua v. United States of America. 
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Chapter II 
- Judgments on the case concerning military and paramilitary 
activities in and against Nicaragua -
30 
There were two decisions in the case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
against Nicaragua: the judgement of 26 November 1984, on the issues of the jurisdiction of the 
Court and the admissibility of the application of Nicaragua, and the judgment of 27 June 1986, 
on the merits of the case or matters of substance. We will go briefly through the former, and 
concentrate on the arguments of the latter. 
Judgment of 26 November 1984, Case concerning military and paramilitary activities in 
and against Nicaragua, jurisdiction of the Court and admissibility of the application 
On 9 April 1984, Nicaragua filed an application instituting proceedings against the United 
States, concerning military and paramilitary activities carried out by the United States in and 
against Nicaragua. The latter affirmed that the jurisdiction of the Court was founded on 
declarations made by the parties accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, and on the 
application of a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation signed by the parties in 1956. 
The United States, on the other hand, sustained that the Court was without jurisdiction to deal 
with the application, and requested the termination of the proceedings. 
The first contention was that Nicaragua's acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ 
had been incomplete and never perfected, because there was no record of an instrument of 
ratification in the files of the League of Nations. The Court, however, argued that Nicaragua's 
declaration concerning the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court was undoubtedly 
valid, because it had ratified the Protocol of Signature of the Statute of the PCIJ in 1929. 
Furthermore, the fact that Nicaragua took part in the United Nations Conference at San 
Francisco, thus ratifying the Statute of the ICJ (24 October 1945), evidenced its acquiescence 
and recognition of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. 
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Secondly, Nicaragua argued that US acceptance was based on a declaration of August 1946, 
which contained the following reservation in relation to Article 36 of the Statute of the IC]: 
"(the contents of the Article will) remain in force for a period of five years and thereafter until 
the expiration of six months after notice may be given to terminate this declaration.,,7l In view 
of this, the government of the United States deposited a notification at the UN three days 
before Nicaragua's application (6 April 1984), stating that "the aforesaid declaration shall not 
apply to disputes with any Central American State or arising out of or related to events in 
Central America ( ... ) this proviso shall take effect immediately and shall remain in force for 
,,72 two years ... 
In the Court's view, the 1984 notification infringed the principle of good faith, for its intention 
was to exempt the United States, with immediate effect, from the obligation to subject itself to 
the Court's jurisdiction in relation to any application relative to Central America. 73 The Court 
asserted that the unilateral nature of declarations does not signify that States are free to amend 
the scope and contents of their solemn commitments, because they establish bilateral 
engagements with other States accepting the same obligation of compulsory jurisdiction. 
Additionally, the United States alleged it had made another reservation to the declaration of 
acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court in 1946 in the sense that its acceptance would not 
extend to disputes arising under a multilateral treaty, unless all the parties to the treaty affected 
by the decision were also parties to the case. As the application of Nicaragua relied on several 
multilateral treaties, namely the UN Charter and the Charter of the Organization of American 
States (OAS), the United States contended that unless Honduras, Costa Rica and EI Salvador 
were also parties to the case, its acceptance could not apply. The Court asserted that the 
objection based on the reservation of the multilateral treaty was not an exclusively preliminary 
71 Op. Cit. Decision of the IC] of26 November 1986, pg. 398 
72 Ibid 
73 Ibid, pg. 417 
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objection,74 as it raised questions concernmg matters of substance. Nevertheless, since 
Nicaragua did not confine its claims to breaches of multilateral treaties, but also to principles 
of general and customary international law, the Court considered it was not barred by the 
multilateral treaty reservation. 
Nicaragua further invoked the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation of 1956 as a 
complementary foundation for the Court's jurisdiction. Article 24, paragraph 2 of the Treaty 
contained a compromisory clause, establishing that any dispute between the parties as to the 
interpretation or application of the treaty, not satisfactorily adjusted by diplomacy, should be 
submitted to the IC}, unless the parties agreed to settle them by some other means. The United 
States, on the other hand, alleged that Nicaragua had not argued in its application any violation 
of the Treaty and, therefore, Article 24 could not be the basis of jurisdiction. According to the 
Court, this disagreement evidenced a dispute between the parties regarding the interpretation 
and application of the Treaty and, consequently, it had jurisdiction under the Treaty to 
entertain the claims. 
In relation to the inadmissibility of Nicaragua's application, the United States alleged that 
Nicaragua had failed to bring before the court those parties whose participation was necessary, 
namely EI Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica. In the ICrs view, nothing prevented other 
States that considered themselves affected by the decision to institute separate proceedings, or 
to employ the procedure of intervention in the judicial process. The claim was therefore 
dismissed. 
Concerning the unlawful use of armed force, breach of peace or acts of aggression by the 
United States against Nicaragua, the former contended that the Court was without jurisdiction 
to decide on the matter. The claim was that the Court was not competent to decide whether US 
actions were justified by the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence or whether, on the contrary, they constituted threats of peace, breaches of peace or 
74 A preliminary objection is one "submitted for the purpose of excluding an examination by the Court of the 
merits of the case, and being one upon which the Court can give a decision without in any way adjudicating upon 
the merits." In Op. Cit. Decision of the ICJ of27 June 1986, pg 30 
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acts of aggression, since these matters were entrusted exclusively to the Security Council. In 
response, the IC] considered that Article 24 of the UN Charter confers primary but not 
exclusive responsibility to the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and 
security. The Council's function is of a political nature, whereas the Court's is purely judicial, 
hence, both organs can perform their separate but complementary functions about the same 
<::'.'cnts. 
Finally, the United States argued that Nicaragua had failed to exhaust the Contadora process, 
established for the resolution of conflicts in Central America.75 The Court dismissed the 
contention, as it considered that the Contadora process was not a regional arrangement for the 
purposes of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. And even if it was, Article 103 of the Charter 
established that obligations acquired under the UN Charter prevailed over those derived from 
any other international agreement. 
Decision of the Court 
By a judgement dated 26 November 1984, the Court found: a) that it had jurisdiction to 
entertain the application on the basis of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court,76 and on the 
basis of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation of 1956 between the United 
States and Nicaragua, and b) that the application was admissible. 
75 The Contadora process was a Latin American diplomatic effort endorsed by the OAS to stabilize the Central 
American situation. It aimed at preventing military confrontation between neighboring states, and also at 
preventing direct military intervention by the United States. Although the United States was not a party to the 
Contadora negotiations, it was understood that it would sign a separate protocol in 1985 agreeing to the terms of a 
final treaty, in areas such as aid to insurgents, military aid, and assistance to Central American governments. For 
further information on the Contadora process see http://countrystudies.us/el-salvador/85.htm 
76 Paragraphs 2 and 5 of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court establish: "( ... ) 2. The states parties to the present 
Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in 
relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes 
concerning: a. the interpretation of a treaty; b. any question of international law; c. the existence of any fact 
which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation; d. the nature or extent of the 
reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation. ( ... ) 5. Declarations made under Article 36 of 
the Statute of the Permanent Court ofIntemational Justice and which are still in force shall be deemed, as 
between the parties to the present Statute, to be acceptances of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International 
Court of Justice for the period which they still have to run and in accordance with their terms." Op. Cit. 
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwwwlibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstatute.htm#C HA PTER I I 
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Decision of the United States not to participate in further proceedings 
As a result of the judgement of 26 November 1984, the US government informed the Court 
that it would not participate in any further proceedings. In its viewpoint, the Court had no 
jurisdiction to entertain the case, and the application should have been declared inadmissible. 
Bya letter dated 18 January 1985, the United States addressed the Court in these terms: 
"The United States is constrained to conclude that the judgement of the Court was 
clearly and manifestly erroneous as to both fact and law. The United States 
remains firmly of the view, for the reasons given in its written and oral pleadings 
that the Court is without jurisdiction to entertain the dispute, and that the 
Nicaraguan application of 9 April 1984 is inadmissible. Accordingly, ( ... ) the 
United States intends not to participate in any further proceedings in 
connection with this case, and reserves its rights in respect of any decision by 
the Court regarding Nicaragua's c1aims.,,77 
Nicaragua called upon the Court to decide the case despite the failure of the respondent to 
appear, invoking Article 53 of the Statute of the Court.78 
Judgment of 27 June 1986, Case concerning military and paramilitary activities in and 
against Nicaragua, Merits 
In the merits phase, Nicaragua requested the Court to adjudge and declare the following: 
The United States violated the UN Charter, the Charter of the Organization of 
American States, the Convention concerning the Duties and Rights of States in the 
event of Civil Strife, by recruiting, training, arming, equipping, financing and 
77 Op. Cit. Decision of the IC] of26 November 1984, pg. 17. Highlight is ours. 
'S Article 5] of the Statute of the COL111 establishes: "I. Whenever one of the parties does not appear before the 
Court, or fails to defend its case, the other party may call upon the Court to decide in favour of its claim. 
2. The Court must, before doing so, satisfy itself, not only that it has jurisdiction in accordance with Articles 36 
and 37, but also that the claim is well founded in fact and law." In op. cit. http://www.icj-
cij.orgiicjwww/ibasicdocumentslibasictextlibasicstatute.htm#CHAPTER II 
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supplying paramilitary groups, and by encouraging, supporting, aiding and directing 
military and paramilitary actions in and against Nicaragua; 
The United States violated Nicaragua's sovereignty by carrying out armed attacks by 
air, land and sea, entering into Nicaraguan territorial waters and airspace, and by 
implementing direct and indirect means through the use and threat of force to coerce 
and intimidate its government; 
The United States unlawfully intervened in Nicaragua's internal affairs; infringed the 
freedom of the high seas, interrupted peaceful maritime commerce, killed, wounded 
and kidnapped Nicaraguan citizens. 
Therefore, Nicaragua's pleadings were that the Court declared that the United States had the 
duty to cease and desist from: 
The use of force - whether direct or indirect, overt or covert -; 
All violations of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of 
Nicaragua; 
All support to any group, organization, movement or individual who engaged or 
planned to engage in military or paramilitary activities in or against Nicaragua; 
All efforts to restrict, block or endanger access to or from Nicaraguan ports; 
All killings, wounding and kidnappings of Nicaraguan citizens. 
Nicaragua also demanded the Court to declare that the United States had the obligation to pay 
reparations for damages to persons, property and the Nicaraguan economy.79 
Arguments of the Court 
The United States did not file any pleading on the merits of the case, nor was it represented at 
the hearings, alleging that the Court was without jurisdiction to entertain the dispute. 
79 Nicaragua claimed: "the United States has withdrawn its own aid to Nicaragua, drastically reduced the quota 
for imports of sugar from Nicaragua to the United States, and imposed a trade embargo; it has also used its 
influence in the Inter-American Development Bank and the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development to block the provision of loans to Nicaragua." In op. cit. Decision of the IeJ of 27 June 1986, pg 22 
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However, one of its contentions in the counter-memorial on the questions of jurisdiction and 
admissibility questioned the legal grounds upon which the IC] could entertain the dispute. The 
answer given by the Court to this objection was fundamental, as it affirmed that the principles 
of international law, mainly non-intervention and non-use of force, were sufficient as legal 
grounds for the resolution of the case. 
The objection dealt with the law applicable to the dispute, posing the following problem for 
the Court: the United States argued that, due to the multilateral treaty reservation of 1946, the 
multilateral treaties invoked by Nicaragua, i.e. the UN Charter and the OAS Charter, could not 
be applied to the case; nor could the principles of international law, as they are included in 
both these instruments. In the US viewpoint, the inclusion of the principles in both Charters 
precluded the possibility that similar rules existed independently in customary international 
law. This argument was problematic because the admission of US allegations purported the 
absence of legal grounds for the IC] to entertain the dispute. In other words, the contention 
entailed that the principles of international law could not be applied independently from the 
UN Charter and the OAS Charter, which were, in effect, inapplicable to the case. 
To resolve this difficulty, the Court took the view that customary international law continues 
to exist independently from treaty-law, in other words, that customary law has a separate 
applicability from the conventions, declarations and treaties in which they are included. In this 
sense, "... there are no grounds for holding that when customary international law is 
comprised of rules identical to those of treaty law, the latter 'supervenes' the former, so that 
the customary international law has no further existence of its own. ,,80 
To support this pivotal contention, the IC] noted that when Article 51 of the UN Charter 
establishes the "inherent right" of individual or collective self-defence, the expression is only 
meaningful on the basis of a "natural" right of self-defence that stems from pre-existing 
customary international law independent from the Charter. Moreover, although the Charter 
does not state that self-defence only warrants measures which are proportional to the armed 
80 Ibid, pg. 95 
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attack and necessary to repel it, these are well instituted rules in customary international law. 
This proves that the Charter does not regulate all aspects of the right of self-defence. 
Hence, it is wrong to assert that customary international law cannot be applied separately from 
international treaty law when they both have the same contents, just as it cannot be held that 
Article 51 "subsumes and supervenes" customary international law in relation to the right of 
self-defence. Indeed, "... customary international law continues to exist and to apply, 
separately from international treaty law, even where the two categories of law have identical 
content.,,81 This argument served as grounds for the Court to rule based on the principles of 
customary international law, despite the fact that neither the UN Charter nor the OAS Charter 
was applicable to the case. 
Since the United States did not file any pleading and was not represented at the hearings on 
the merits phase, the Court was bound to analyse the argument adduced in the counter-
memorial on the questions of jurisdiction and admissibility, i.e. that US actions had been 
based on the right of collective self-defence, guaranteed by Article 51 of the UN Charter. The 
Court felt further obliged to examine whether there were other rules in customary international 
law not mentioned by the United States that could justify its conduct. As a result, it studied the 
right to take counter-measures in response to a conduct that does not necessarily constitute 
an armed attack. 
The line of argumentation followed by the Court concerning both the right of collective self-
defence and the right to take counter-measures was syllogistic. As to the former, the main 
premise was: collective self-defence constitutes a justification for the infringement of the 
principle of non-use of force; minor premise: the facts on which the United States based the 
invocation of collective self-defence did not meet the conditions for its conduct to be justified; 
conclusion: the United States contravened the principle of non-use of force. 
81 Ibid, pg. 96 
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The argument based on counter-measures was structured as follows. Main premise: the right 
of a State to take counter-measures in response to a previous wrongful act from another State 
constitutes an exception to the principle of non-intervention; minor premise: the United States 
was not the direct victim of Nicaragua's prior wrong-doing; conclusion, the United States was 
not entitled to take counter-measures against Nicaragua and, hence, it infringed the principle 
of non-intervention. We will take a look at each of the arguments separately, in order to 
understand the way the Court reached its conclusions. 
The right of collective self-defence - principle of non-use of force 
The concept of self-defence in inter-State relations has been defined as "a lawful use of force, 
under conditions prescribed by international law, in response to a previous unlawful use (or at 
least a threat) of force."s2 The invocation of the right of individual or collective self-defence 
purports the intention to justify a conduct that would otherwise be wrongful. Acting in self-
defence or collective self-defence constitutes an exception to the rule that prohibits the use of 
force. If the exercise of the right is justifiable, then the intervention involving the use of armed 
force would not constitute a breach of the principle of non-use of force. However, if the 
absence of that justification is proven, the invocation of the right implies an admission of the 
conduct, the wrongfulness of that conduct, and the breach of international law. 
In the Court's viewpoint, the defence of a conduct that is contrary to international law by 
appealing to exceptions contained in the rules themselves entails a confirmation of the rules, 
rather than a weakening of the norms and principles. Thus, if the prior armed attack could not 
be sufficiently established, the invocation of the justification of collective self-defence by the 
United States implied not only a recognition of the wrongfulness of the conduct, but also a 
reaffirmation of the rule of non-use of force. 
The Court proved that the parties shared an opinio juris with regards to the binding character 
of the rule of non-use of force from their consent to the Declaration on Principles of 
82 Dinstein, Yoram, War. Agression and Self-Defence. [New York, Cambridge University Press, 1995] pg. 175 
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International Law, Friendly Relations and Cooperation, which implies an acceptance of the set 
of rules therein established. This Declaration reaffirms the principles of non-use of force and 
non-intervention, and provides that there are certain cases in which the use of force is lawful, 
that is, when the State is acting in collective or individual self-defence. Thus, subscribing to 
this instrument entails an acceptance to the customary rule that the lawfulness of the response 
to an armed attack depends on the observance of the criteria of necessity and proportionality 
of the measures taken in self-defence. 
Under the provision of Article 51 of the UN Charter, a State is permitted to use force only in 
response to armed aggression. The use of force is forbidden except when there has been an 
armed attack by another State that justifies using force against it. What is understood by 
"armed attack"? According to the Court, an armed attack is a type of aggression, defined by 
Article 1 of the Definition of Aggression annexed to General Assembly resolution 3314 in the 
following terms: "Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations."s3 
Article 3 of the Definition of Aggression establishes: 
"Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, subject to and 
in accordance with the provisions of Article 2, qualify as an act of aggression: 
a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of 
another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such 
invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another 
State, or part thereof; 
b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of 
another State, or use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another 
State; 
c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of 
another State; 
d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or the air forces, 
or marine and air fleets of another State; 
83 UN General Assembly Resolution 3314 of 14 December 1974, Definition of Aggression, in 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/29/ares29.htm 
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e) The use of anned forces of one State which are within the territory of 
another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the 
conditions provided for in the agreement, or any extension of their presence in 
such territory beyond the tennination of the agreement; 
f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the 
disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of 
aggression against a third State; 
g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of anned bands, groups, irregulars 
or mercenaries, which carry out acts of anned force against another State of such 
gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement 
therein.,,84 
40 
In the Court's interpretation, Article 3 paragraph g of the Definition of Aggression leads to 
infer that an anned attack must be understood as including not merely action by regular forces 
across an international border, but also the sending of anned groups, which carry out acts of 
anned force against another State of such gravity as to amount to, inter alia, "an actual 
armed attack conducted by regular forces".85 In other words, the Court argued that the 
sending of anned bands to the territory of another State might indeed constitute an anned 
attack, but only if such an operation supersedes a mere frontier incident on the basis of its 
scale an effects. In the Court's viewpoint, assistance to rebels in the fonn of the provision of 
weapons, logistical or other kind of support does not fall into the category of "anned attack". 
It may be regarded as a threat or use of force, or amount to intervention in the internal affairs 
of another State. 
While the United States allegations intended to justify its wrongful conduct, Nicaragua's 
arguments were directed to prove that US activities were not justified, and therefore 
constituted a breach of the applicable instruments and principles of international law. In 
Nicaragua's tenns, the references made by the United States to the justification of collective 
self-defence were merely "pretexts" for its activities, as the US' real objectives were to impose 
its will upon Nicaragua and to force it to comply with US demands. The Court sustained that if 
Nicaragua had been in fact giving support to the anned opposition in EI Salvador, and if this 
84 Ibid 
85 Op. Cit. Decision of the IC] of 27 June 1986, pg. 103 
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constituted an anned attack on the latter, the existence of additional motives could not deprive 
the United States from exercising the right to resort to collective self-defence. 
Therefore, the IC], had to detennine in the first place which of the actions committed in and 
against Nicaragua were imputable to the United States, and secondly, whether Nicaragua's 
actions against its neighbours amounted to an anned attack. The United States was found 
responsible for the following actions: the mining of Nicaraguan ports, the infringement of 
Nicaraguan airspace with over-flights by United States military aircrafts, the carrying out of 
military manoeuvres jointly with Honduras near the frontier with Nicaragua, the financing and 
supporting of the military and paramilitary activities of the Contras, and the supply of the 
manual on psychological guerrilla warfare. Were these actions justified in response to the 
requests from EI Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica for assistance in their self-defence 
against an alleged aggression by Nicaragua? 
In order to answer this question, it was necessary to detennine whether the anned aggression 
against Nicaragua's neighbours really occurred. The United States claimed that Nicaragua had 
"promoted and supported guerrilla violence in neighbouring countries", and had openly 
conducted cross-border military attacks on Honduras and Costa Rica. Nicaragua refuted the 
claims concerning EI Salvador, but did not refer to the accusations concerning Honduras and 
Costa Rica in the proceedings on the merits. The court studied both cases. 
In reference to EI Salvador, the United States affinned that "a major portion of the anns and 
other material sent by Cuba and other communist countries to the Salvadorian insurgents 
transits Nicaragua with the pennission and assistance of the Sandinistas."s6 Nicaragua, on the 
other hand, did not deny there had been traffic of anns through the borders with Honduras and 
Costa Rica. In a declaration given in 1984, the Foreign Minister of Nicaragua explained that 
the Nicaraguan borders were extremely difficult to control and it was not easy to seal them off 
to all unwanted and illegal traffic. Moreover, it was well known that in 1981 President Daniel 
86 Ibid, pg. 76 
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Ortega87 offered the United States to stop the "movement of military aid, or any other kind of 
aid, through Nicaragua to El Salvador",88 thus accepting that there had been some involvement 
of Nicaragua in the support of insurgency groups in El Salvador. 
After studying the evidence, the ICJ found it established that between July 1979 and the early 
months of 1981 an intermittent flow of arms was routed via Nicaragua to the armed opposition 
in El Salvador. Nevertheless, it was not proven that the assistance had continued to reach the 
Salvadorian armed opposition on any significant scale since the early months of 1981. Neither 
was it established that the government of Nicaragua was directly responsible for the flow of 
arms. It was the Court's view that if the exceptional resources of the United States, together 
with the cooperation of the governments of El Salvador and Honduras, were powerless to 
prevent the arms and provisions traffic, it was unreasonable to demand from the government 
of Nicaragua a higher degree of diligence. The United States could have stopped the supply of 
arms and provisions to the Salvadorian insurgents by using a strong patrol force along the 
frontiers, rendering the military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua 
disproportionate, as well as unnecessary to achieve that purpose. 
Consequently, there had been no armed attack against El Salvador. But additionally, in terms 
of the conditions for the exercise of the right of collective self-defence, the criteria of 
proportionality and necessity of the response were not met by the United States. According to 
the ICJ, it would have been possible to eliminate the main danger to the Salvadorian 
government without embarking on the activities in and against Nicaragua. This fact weakened 
the criteria of necessity. As to the condition of proportionality, the mining of the ports, the 
attacks on ports, oil installations etc., could not possibly satisfy this criterion. 
Having dismissed the claims with regards to El Salvador, the Court turned to the allegations 
concerning Honduras and Costa Rica. In effect, it was clearly established that certain trans-
border military incursions into the territories of Honduras and Costa Rica were imputable to 
1i7 Daniel Ortega Saavedra was a member of the Junta for National Reconstruction of Nicaragua. Later, he was 
elected President, from 1985 to 1990. 
88 Op. Cit. Decision of the ICJ of 27 June 1986, pg. 79 
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Nicaragua. However, the little infonnation and evidence available on the cross-border attacks 
rendered it difficult to decide whether they could be treated for legal purposes as amounting to 
an anned attack. The ICJ explained that, according to customary international law, collective 
self-defence cannot be exercised unless two conditions are met: that the State which considers 
itsdf the victim of an anned attack has fonnally declared it, and that it has made a fonnal 
request to the State from which it expects to receive help and protection. 
In the case of Honduras and Costa Rica, there was not sufficient evidence that proved that 
such requests for assistance were made to the United States. This led the Court to declare that 
there was no way to demonstrate that the trans-border military incursions amounted to an 
anned attack. EI Salvador's request, on the other hand, was presented when the United States 
had already started its activities in Nicaragua. Based on the foregoing, the Court concluded 
that "neither these incursions, nor the alleged supply of anns to the opposition in EI Salvador, 
may be relied on as justifying the exercise of the right of collective self-defence. ,,89 
The right to take counter-measures - principle of non intervention 
Once it was proven that there were no grounds for the justification of collective self-defence, 
the Court turned to the examination of the right to take counter-measures, as a possible 
exoneration for the infringement of the principle of non-intervention. The premise was that the 
use of counter-measures in response to a previous intervention, when lawfully undertaken, 
constitutes a justification for the violation of the non-intervention rule. Thus, in the ICJ's 
view, counter-measures, in relation to non-intervention, were analogous to collective self-
defence with respect to non-use of force, that is, as an exception to the principle. 
The ICJ presented the rule of non-intervention as a corollary of the principle of the sovereign 
equality of States, for the tenet involves the right of every sovereign State to conduct its affairs 
without outside interference. 9o The Court asserted that the opinio juris regarding the existence 
of the principle of non-intervention was unquestionable, as evidenced in the numerous 
89 Ibid, pg. 120 
90 Ibid, pg. 108 
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declarations and resolutions adopted by international organizations. 91 As to the parties, both 
Nicaragua and the United States participated in the General Assembly meetings for the 
adoption of the Declaration on Principles of International Law, Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation. Likewise, the ratification by both States of the legal instruments concernmg 
inter-American relations allowed inferring their irrefutable acceptance of the rule. 
When defining the content of non-intervention, the IC] limited itself to those aspects which 
appeared to be relevant to the resolution of the dispute. Thus, it emphasized that intervention 
is wrongful when it uses methods of coercion to affect the political, economic, social, and 
cultural systems of a State, as well as its foreign relations. All these areas, the Court stressed, 
must remain free choices of each State.92 Notably, like in Hedley Bull's definition, coercion is 
the defining and essential element of forbidden interventions in the ICJ's judgments. This 
element is particularly evident in cases where the intervention involves the use of force, either 
when it is done through direct military action, or through the indirect support of subversive or 
terrorist groups. These forms of intervention are wrongful in the light of both the principle of 
non-intervention and the principle of non-use of force. 
According to customary international law, an intervention involving the use of force of a 
lesser degree of gravity than an armed attack produces an entitlement for the Victim State to 
take proportionate counter-measures. This entitlement implies that, under those 
circumstances, there is no breach of the principle of non-intervention. In order to determine 
whether the United States could have justifiably taken counter-measures against Nicaragua, 
the Court analysed two different arguments. 
The first one stated that counter-intervention could have been justified as an exception to the 
principle of non-intervention, if the practice of States evidenced the existence of an opinio 
juris regarding a new right to intervene in another State in support of an opposition whose 
cause appeared particularly worthy of support. If the existence of such a new right was proven, 
91 Ibid, pg. 106 
92 Ibid, pg. 108 
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then a fundamental modification of customary international law concerning non-intervention 
would have occurred, thus justifying the United States conduct. 
The Court therefore analysed whether this unprecedented exception to the principle 
constituted a modification of the customary international rule of non-intervention. It found 
that, although some States do justify interventions for reasons concerning the domestic 
policies of the intervened, its ideology, the level of its armaments, etc., these justifications 
remain on a political level, and do not enter into the field of international law. According to 
the ICl, it is difficult to see what would remain of the principle of non-intervention in 
international law if intervention, which is already allowable at the request of the government 
of a State, were also to be allowed at the request of the opposition. Neither the United States 
nor Nicaragua argued in favour of a new right of intervention in support of an opposition 
within another State. Hence, the practice of States does not show a tendency in that direction, 
and consequently, such a situation does not pertain to international law. The first possible 
argument in favour of the legality of counter-intervention was thus dismissed by the Court. 
The second argument consisted in determining whether the activities of the United States 
towards Nicaragua could be justified as a response to Nicaragua's interventions in the internal 
affairs of its neighbours, namely El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica. The Court reiterated 
that a State that has been the victim of a previous intervention involving a use of force that 
does not amount to an armed attack is entitled to take proportionate counter-measures without 
infringing the principle of non-intervention. 
The case in point, however, did not meet the conditions for the exercise of this right, because 
the counter-measures were not taken by El Salvador, Honduras or Costa Rica - the alleged 
victims of Nicaragua's incursions - but by a third State, the United States. From a legal 
standpoint, the applicable law does not warrant a justification to take collective counter-
measures involving the use of force. Thus, even assuming that Nicaragua had in fact 
committed the acts of which it was accused (most of which were not sufficiently proven), the 
only States that could have justifiably taken proportionate counter-measures would have been 
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its neighbours, particularly EI Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica. A third State was not 
justified to respond, especially not by using force. This led to the obvious conclusion that, in 
the absence of a plausible justification, the principle of non-intervention had been contravened 
by the United States. 
ICJ's assessment of the facts in relation to the rules applicable to the case 
The Court regarded the following actions as breaches of the principle of non-use of force: the 
laying of mines in Nicaraguan internal or territorial waters in early 1984; the attacks on 
Nicaraguan ports, oil installations and a naval base; and the arming and training of the 
"Contras". As previously said, the Court did not find that the conditions were met for the 
exception to the prohibition of the use of force to be applied, i.e., the exercise of the right of 
collective self-defence. In support of its argument, the IC] stressed the fact that the United 
States never filed the report established in Article 51 of the UN Charter in case a State 
exercises the right of individual or collective self-defence. This fact is noteworthy, especially 
because the United States had always insisted in the Security Council that failure to observe 
the requirement to make a report contradicted a State's claim to be acting on the basis of 
collective self-defence. 
With regards to the principle of non-intervention, the Court found it established that, by its 
support to the Contras, the United States intended to coerce the government of Nicaragua to 
act against its will on issues which were of the free choice of Nicaragua. The tribunal affirmed 
that if a State supports and assists armed groups of another State whose intentions are to 
overthrow the government of that State, this amounts to an illegal intervention in its internal 
affairs. Accordingly, " ... the support given by the United States, up to the end of September 
1984, to the military and paramilitary activities of the contras in Nicaragua, by financial 
support, training, supply of weapons, intelligence and logistic support, constitutes a clear 
breach of the principle of non-intervention. ,,93 
93 Ibid, pg. 124 
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The IC] was emphatic to assert that whether Nicaragua chose to have a communist regime or a 
democratic one, this was a decision that fell within the scope of its sovereignty. The Court thus 
maintained: "However the regime in Nicaragua be defined, adherence by a State to any 
particular doctrine does not constitute a violation of customary international law; to hold 
otherwise would make nonsense of the fundamental principle of State sovereignty, on which 
the whole of international law rests, and the freedom of choice of the political, social, 
economic and cultural system of a State. ,,94 
Also, the aid given under the rubric of "humanitarian aid" infringed the principle of non-
intervention, as it was only directed to the Contras and their dependents, in discrimination of 
the rest of the victims of the conflict. 
As to the actions of economic nature taken by the United States against Nicaragua, the Court 
considered they constituted a violation of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation 
of 1956. 
The Court found that the assistance to the "Contras", the mining, the over-flights, as well as 
the attacks on ports and oil installations, etc., not only constituted violations of the non-use of 
force, and non-intervention principles, but also of the sovereignty of Nicaragua. In addition, 
the laying of mines in or near Nicaraguan ports constituted a violation of the freedom of 
maritime commerce and communications, in detriment of Nicaragua's economy. 
Both the laying of mines without giving the proper warning or notification, as well as some of 
the contents of the manual on psychological operations distributed to the "Contras" by the CIA 
amounted to breaches to Article 3 common to all four Geneva Conventions, in other words, an 
infringement of the principles of humanitarian law. 
In the light of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation of 1956, the mining of the 
ports and the attacks, as well as the trade embargo imposed on Nicaragua undermined the 
94 Ibid, pg. 133 
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whole spirit of the Treaty, as they were not necessary measures for the protection of US 
interests. 
Final Decision 
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court decided: 
1. That it was required to apply the multilateral treaty reservation contained in the declaration 
of acceptance of jurisdiction of the IC] made by the government of the United States in 1946. 
2. To reject the argument of collective self-defence adduced by the United States to justify its 
military and paramilitary activities in Nicaragua. 
3. That by training, arming, equipping, financing and supplying the Contra forces, the United 
States had acted in breach of the principle of non-intervention. 
4. That the United States had violated the principle of the non-use of force, by performing 
attacks on Nicaraguan territory. 
5. That the United States had violated the sovereignty of Nicaragua by directing and 
authorizing over-flights of Nicaraguan territory. 
6. That by laying mines in the internal or territorial waters of Nicaragua, the United States had 
acted in breach of its obligations under customary international law not to use force, not to 
intervene in the internal affairs of another State, not to violate its sovereignty, and not to 
interrupt peaceful maritime commerce. 
7. That the United States had infringed its obligations founded in the Treaty of Friendship, 
Commerce and Navigation signed with Nicaragua in 1956. 
8. That by failing to warn about the existence and location of the mines, the United States had 
acted against customary international law. 
9. That by producing and distributing the manual on psychological operations, the United 
States had encouraged the commission of acts contrary to the general principles of 
humanitarian law. 
10. That the United States had committed acts to deprive of its object the Treaty of Friendship 
by declaring the trade embargo against Nicaragua. 
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11. That the United States was under the immediate duty to cease and refrain from all acts that 
constituted breaches ofthe aforesaid obligations. 
12. That the United States had to make reparation to Nicaragua for all the injury caused with 
its actions. The amount of the reparation would be settled by the Court in a subsequent 
procedure. 
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Chapter III 
- Comments on the Judgment of 27 June 1986-
The concept of "armed attack" 
Although the main subject of the thesis is the principle of non intervention, it is important to 
look into the issue of the definition of "armed attack", because in the Nicaragua case the 
breach of the principle of non-intervention is inseparable from the breach of the principle of 
non-use of force. Indeed, the Court affirmed that "acts constituting a breach of the customary 
principle of non-intervention will also, if they directly or indirectly involve the use of force, 
constitute a breach of the principle of non-use of force in international relations. ,,95 
The arguments drawn by the Court in order to demonstrate the lack of conditions for the 
configuration of the justification of collective self-defence seem sound and coherent. 
Nevertheless, after a careful reading of the judgment one thing remains unclear: what amounts 
to an "armed attack"? Indeed, the Court maintained that it was necessary to distinguish the 
gravest forms of the use of force (those which amount to an armed attack) from other less 
grave forms, and it seemed to classify the frontier incidents in this latter category. According 
to the Tribunal, there are certain measures which, despite involving the use of force and 
amounting to aggression, do not constitute an armed attack. It is all a matter of "scale and 
effects". However, these notions of "scale and effects" seem quite blurry and confusing. What 
threshold must be reached so that the use of force may be labelled as an armed attack? 
The Court affirmed that an armed attack is a type of aggression; one that involves a high 
degree of use of force, while other incidents are just less serious types of aggression. It seemed 
to derive the definition of "armed attack" from Resolution 3314 on the Definition of 
Aggression, according to which the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity or political independence of another State constitutes aggression.96 The 
95 Ibid, pg. 109 
96 Op. Cit. Resolution 3314, Definition of Aggression 
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Resolution suggests a list of actions that amount to acts of aggression, but subsequently 
affinns that the acts enumerated are not exhaustive. 
The acts listed are basically the following: the invasion or attack of the territory of another 
State; the bombardment or use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State; 
the blockade of the ports or coasts of another State; the attack on the land, sea or the air forces, 
or marine and air fleets of another State; the use of anned forces within the territory of another 
State in contravention of the agreement made with that State; allowing its own territory to be 
used for the perpetration of an act of aggression against a third State; and the sending of anned 
bands which carry out acts of anned force against another State of such gravity as to amount 
to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein. 97 
From the definition of aggression established in Article 1 of the Resolution 3314, it is clear 
that Nicaragua committed acts of aggression against its neighbours, especially against EI 
Salvador, by sending anns and supporting the opposition of that country. The problem is that a 
simple act of aggression does not justify the exercise of the right of self-defence. Indeed, 
Article 51 of the UN Charter establishes: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a 
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to 
maintain international peace and security ... ,,98 Thus, the article does not make reference to 
aggression, but to "anned attack". Since Article 51 is included in Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, under the title "Action with respect to threats to peace, breaches of peace, and acts of 
aggression", one might be led to think that an anned attack is a breach of peace more serious 
than an act of aggression and that, for that reason, it justifies the disregard of the principle of 
non-use of force. 
The Court's interpretation of Article 3 of the Definition of Aggression seems to derive from 
this reckoning. In effect, as abovementioned, Article 3 paragraph g of Resolution 3314 is 
understood by the IC] in the sense that a mere frontier incident does not constitute an anned 
97 Ibid 
98 Highlight is ours. 
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attack. For it to be such, it must include the sending of armed groups, which carry out acts of 
armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to any of the actions listed in 
Article 2 of the Definition of Aggression or, in the Court's own words, an actual armed attack 
conducted by regular forces. 
This definition is therefore tautological: for an armed attack to effectively be an "armed 
attack", it must involve actions that amount to an "actual armed attack". The concept remains 
quite unclear. The fallacious argument made by the IC] to overlook the fact that Nicaragua did 
commit acts of aggression against EI Salvador constitutes a shortcoming in the Court's 
reasomng. 
Notwithstanding, this setback does not really affect the ICJ's conclusion that there were no 
grounds for the exercise of the right of collective self-defence, since the decision was based on 
formal aspects, that is, the absence of the declarations of Nicaragua's neighbours of being 
under attack, and the lack of proof that they had made a request to the United States to come in 
their aid against Nicaragua's aggressions. 
The right to resort to counter-measures 
As stated before, the ban on intervention in the internal affairs of States is not absolute. 
Intervention is justifiable when undertaken upon invitation of the intervened; when done on 
the grounds of self-defence; when collectively authorized by the international community 
through an international organization, namely, the Security Council; when carried out for 
humanitarian reasons, commonly known as humanitarian intervention, and when done to repel 
another intervention, also known as counter-measures or counter-intervention. 
Counter-measures are defined as unlawful actions that are justified by a prior violation. They 
are retaliatory activities that do not involve the use of force, and which would constitute a 
breach of international law if they were not taken in response to an initial wrongful act by the 
other State. Thus, a State that resorts to counter-measures legitimately takes justice into its 
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own hands. In its attempt to frame an adequate regime of unilateral responses to unlawful 
State conduct, the International Law Commission stated that the object of counter-measures is 
"to inflict punishment or to secure performance.,,99 Applying counter-measures in excess of its 
lawful function makes the act unlawful, especially if the purpose is to inflict punishment. 
In analogy to self-defence, measures taken in retaliation must meet certain conditions: they 
must be proportional to the injury suffered, and no prior commitment to resort to other means 
of dispute settlement must be in place between the parties involved. 100 Economic sanctions and 
forceful actions short of armed force are commonly used by international actors as counter-
measures, but the use of armed force and violations of human rights are strictly prohibited. 
The topic of counter-measures or counter-intervention has not been free of discussion and 
debate. Many believe that counter-measures have essentially been an instrument of powerful 
States to enforce their interests upon weaker States. IOI Others, however, maintain that, since 
the use of force is forbidden, the international order has restricted the use of counter-
intervention to an extent that no serious damage can be inflicted to the wrong-doing State. In 
this sense, "[n]ormally, a conflict which commences with an initial act of an allegedly wrong-
doing State, and which prompts a response ( ... ) termed a counter-measure, remains within the 
area of clashes and frictions that can be settled by diplomatic means. ,,102 
The Court examined the right to take counter-measures as a possible justification for the 
United States' activities in and against Nicaragua. Two elements, however, excluded a priori 
the configuration of the exception to the principle of non-intervention in the present case: the 
use of force by the United States, and the fact that the United States was not the victim of 
Nicaragua's wrongdoing. As has been said, the use of armed force is prohibited as a counter-
measure. The indirect support of subversive groups with the purpose of affecting the political 
system of a State evidences the element of coercion, which characterises an unlawful 
99 International Law Commission, Fiftieth Session on State Responsibility, in 
http://untreaty.un.org/iJc/documentation/engJish/a cn4 488 add3.pdf 
100 O'Connell, Mary Ellen, "Lawful responses to terrorism", in http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/forumnew30.htm 
101 Op. Cit. Tomuschat, pg. 2 
I O~ ibid 
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intervention in the internal affairs of a State. Hence, the covert actions carried out by the 
United States (i.e. the mining of ports and attacks on infrastructure) immediately eliminated 
the possibility of exoneration of guilt in terms of the conditions for the lawfulness of counter-
measures. 
On the other hand, it is clear that counter-measures are only allowed when a State has been the 
victim of a previous intervention that does not amount to an armed attack. The Victim State is 
thus entitled to take proportionate counter-measures short of the use of armed force. The fact 
that the United States was never the direct victim of Nicaragua's border incidents (which 
would have been materially impossible), or the supply of arms and financial assistance to the 
opposition, automatically excluded it from legitimately exercising the right of counter-
intervention. The only States that could have justifiably taken proportionate counter-measures 
were El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica. As the Court affirmed, international law does not 
warrant a justification to take collective counter-measures, especially not those involving the 
use of force. 
The conclusion that the principle of non-intervention had been violated by the United States 
for not being entitled to take counter-measures was therefore obvious with regards to the 
covert actions, as well as to the assistance, financial support, training, supply of weapons, 
intelligence and logistic support to the Contras. Notwithstanding, it was not clear in relation to 
the economic measures taken against Nicaragua. Could these actions have been justified as 
counter-measures? In the Court's viewpoint, the cessation of economic aid in 1981, the 
pressure put on International Banks to block loans to Nicaragua, the reduction of the quota for 
sugar imports from Nicaragua by 90 per cent, and the total trade embargo declared on 1 May 
1985, could not be regarded as breaches of the customary law principle of non-intervention, 
but only as a violation of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation of 1956. 
However, they could have plausibly been justified as counter-measures, since they did not 
involve the use of force and were taken in response to a previous aggression from Nicaragua 
against EI Salvador. The ICI, however, did not embark in the analysis of this option, which 
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seemed more sound than justifying the covert actions as counter-measures. This constitutes 
another shortcoming of the Court's reasoning. 
It is clear that the Court's determination of the infringement of the principles of non-use of 
force and non-intervention followed an inductive analysis that required discharging all the 
possible justifications that could exonerate the United States from the responsibility for its 
activities in Nicaragua. This leads to wonder whether the illegality of intervention is always 
determined by the absence of justifying reasons. Although the general rule is that of non-
intervention in the internal affair of States, when an intervention actually occurs, the process 
of assessing the interference seems to require the examination of all the possible justifying 
arguments, before condemning the incursion. Thus, an intervention is not censured as 
immediately unlawful; it is unlawful after it has been established that there was not a good 
reason to validate it. 
An intervention that involves the use of force is clearly banned by the UN Charter, unless it is 
done on the grounds of self-defence. Therefore, the study of an intervention of this kind 
demands the dismissal of the exoneration causes for the unlawful use of force, in order to be 
framed as an illegal intervention. Of course, there are cases in which the violation is blatant 
and manifest, and it can be classified an reproached straight away as a clear a infringement of 
the rule. But these are the exception. Most cases fluctuate in a grey zone that demands the 
examination of the behaviour of both parties, in order to determine the existence or not of 
justifying causes for their conduct. 
To sum up, there are two mam flaws in the ICJ's argumentation: firstly, the circular or 
tautological definition of the concept of "armed attack", which allowed for the Court to 
neglect Nicaragua's aggression against EI Salvador; secondly, the lack of analysis of the 
actions of economic nature as possible counter-measures, which would have minimized the 
extent of the violation of the principle of non-intervention, limiting it only to those activities 
that involved the use of force. 
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PART TWO 
- ANALYSIS OF THE BEHAVIOUR AND MOTIVES OF THE PARTIES -
Despite the United Nations' ban on the use of force and intervention, these practices have 
continued to be common in international relations. The attitude assumed by the superpowers 
towards weaker States often leaves the sensation that powerful States only abide by 
international legislation when it suits their interests. The case in point is a good example, 
taking into account that "the United States only ceased to take part in the proceedings after a 
Judgment had been given adverse to its contentions ... ,,103 
Some authors, like Michael Glennon, affirm that the UN Charter is grounded on a premise that 
is no longer valid, that is, the assumption that the core threat to international security still 
comes from interstate violence. On the contrary, he asserts, major threats come nowadays 
from intrastate conflicts which justify the use of intervention. Hence, when justice calls for 
intervention, international law must be sacrificed. In this sense, "[ e ]vents since the end of the 
Cold War starkly show that the anti-interventionist regime has fallen out of sync with modern 
notions of justice.,,104 Tony Smith agrees with this view, as he argues that much suffering 
could be spared in the world if the United States, working with other countries through 
multilateral institutions like the United Nations, the Organization of American States (OAS), 
or NATO, "took a clear position on what is not tolerable in world affairs and then moved 
decisively to enforce the collective will in areas where such efforts could produce results.,,105 
In other words, these authors contend that intervention should be optional for strong states and 
international institutions, when they consider it necessary for humanitarian reasons, 
notwithstanding the mandates of the law. These arguments, however problematic, might only 
apply to cases where intervention is necessary for humanitarian purposes, not to those where it 
is undertaken to manipulate the outcome of an internal conflict through the use of force. In the 
latter, there is no doubt that the principle of non-intervention remains well-established in 
1030p. Cit. Decision of the ICJ of 27 June 1986, pg. 23 
104 Glennon, Michael J., "The New Interventionism: The Search for a Just International Law", Foreign Affairs, 
May/June 1999. 
105 Smith, Tony, "In Defense of Intervention", Foreign Affairs, November/December 1994 
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contemporary international law. Dictatorial interferences in sovereIgn matters, such as the 
choice of a political, economic, social and cultural system, and the formulation of foreign 
policy, are prohibited by international legislation. 
The relationship between the United States and Latin America has been particularly 
problematic, because it has operated under a set of rules almost independent from international 
law. With the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine (1823), the United States adopted a policy 
of intervention in Latin America to protect its vital and national security interests, repeatedly 
asserting a right to interfere in other States' affairs. 106 During the Cold War, the grounds for 
intervention were given by the Truman Doctrine of Containment. The continuous appeal to 
these and other doctrines, however, does not render them legal. On the contrary, it only 
stresses the fact that when it comes to US interests, the United States has no shame in 
disobeying international law. 
The United States 
The facts and arguments described above show that the dispute of the United States was not 
against Nicaragua itself, but against Soviet expansion. Lying behind the use of covert actions 
was US protection of its national security interests versus the threat of communism. Covert 
operations and paramilitary activities were commonly used as part of US national security 
policy during the Cold War, in breach of the non-interventionist rule. 
The Nicaragua case includes several features that fit the description of illegal intervention in 
the domestic affairs of another State. Indeed, intervention has been defined as a dictatorial or 
coercive interference by an outside party in the sphere of jurisdiction of a sovereign State. In 
the present case, US interference in Nicaragua's affairs was both dictatorial and coercive: 
dictatorial, because the United States is superior to Nicaragua in power; coercive, because it 
was undertaken against Nicaragua's will. Secondly, the intervention was direct, because 
through the use of covert actions the US government intended to change Nicaragua's 
106 Op. Cit. Hilarie, pg. 1 
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communist affiliation. Ideology, whether capitalist, communist, socialist or democratic, falls 
within the sovereign sphere of States, and no other State or superpower is allowed to violate 
this right to ideological freedom. Thirdly, the interference was clandestine, as the instruments 
employed were under the control of the CIA and the NSC staff, and were not even known to 
the US Congress. Finally, the mining, the attacks on ports and infrastructure, and the arming 
and training of the Contras entailed the use of force under conditions that contravened the UN 
Charter. 
Loch Johnson suggests there are four thresholds or levels of infringement of international law 
in the "ladder of covert operations".107 The first threshold consists on routine intelligence 
operations that include counterintelligence activities and the adoption of security measures, 
which do not represent a serious breach of the other State's sovereignty and the non-
interventionist rule. The second threshold implies a higher degree of intrusiveness, as it 
includes actions such as low-level funding of friendly groups, the use of propaganda to 
manipulate the general opinion on specific issues, surveillance against the target nations 
through high-altitude reconnaissance satellites, etc. Although these activities are commonly 
accepted, they contravene the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. Threshold three 
purports more dangerous covert actions, i.e. close-up, on-the-ground, direct operations against 
the desired target, including paramilitary operations, which are openly contrary to 
international law. Finally, in threshold four the lives of innocent people are placed in extreme 
jeopardy, due to the damages covert operations might cause. Actions such as the supply of 
sophisticated arms to rebel factions, major hostage-rescue attempts, torture, major secret wars, 
and assassination plots are comprised in this level. Obviously, all of them are blatant 
violations of the basic rules and principles of international law. 
The actions directed by the United States against Nicaragua range between thresholds one and 
three. Therefore, they entail a clear breach of international law by the United States. 
Furthermore, none of the possible exceptions to the principle of non-intervention apply to the 
case. There was no invitation from Nicaragua to the United States to interfere in its internal 
107 Op. cit. Johnson, pg. 61 
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affairs; no collective authorization was gIven by the Security Council; and finally, the 
intrusion was not undertaken for humanitarian reasons. More importantly, the argumentation 
of the ICJ proved that the United States had neither the right to exercise collective self-
defence, nor to resort to counter-measures, since the conditions were not met for these legal 
features to apply. 
Consequently, US actions contravened the UN Charter (Article 2-7), the Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Articles 2, 4 and 7), the 
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the 
Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty, the Declaration on Principles of 
International Law, Friendly Relations and Cooperation, and the Declaration on Principles of 
International Law. Unfortunately, due to the absence of mechanisms to enforce international 
law, and due to the place the United States occupies in the United Nations and the Security 
Council, this breach had no material consequences, but only theoretical costs in terms of 
compliance with the Court's decision. 
The origins of US counter-insurgency policies in Latin America lie in the particular values set 
out by the Monroe Doctrine. In 1823, President James Monroe addressed a message to Europe 
in which he established the basic principles that would later become the "weapons of 
American expansion as well as hemispheric defence.,,108 This message, known as the Monroe 
Doctrine, was based on fears that Europe would intervene in the Latin American States that 
had just declared their independence from European empires. The United States was 
determined to support Latin America's pursuit of autonomy, hoping to become the leader of a 
republican hemisphere where trade would flourish. At the end of the nineteenth century the 
United States began to playa notable role in the Latin countries of the Americas. 
The aim of the Monroe Doctrine was the protection of US peace and security. It had three 
basic tenets: non-colonization, non-intervention, and isolation. The non-colonization clause 
established that former European colonies, now American States, could not be subjected to 
108 Bradford, Perkins, "The Creation of a Republican Empire 1776 - 1865", The Cambridge History of American 
Foreign Relations, Volume I, [New York, Cambridge University Press, 1993] pg, 168 
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future colonization. 109 The non-intervention canon was a warning to Europe not to intervene in 
the internal affairs of the American States which had just declared themselves independent. I 10 
The isolationist principle proclaimed that the United States would refrain from taking part in 
European politics, implying that Europe should henceforth abstain from intruding in US 
domestic affairs. III 
The policy was, therefore, "America for the Americans". However, it was far from being a 
proclamation of complete solidarity with Central and South America. 112 The acknowledgment 
of the new States had several objectives: establishing US influence to undercut Europe, 
assisting commerce, and encouraging the growth of republicanism. In this sense, a British 
paper of that time commented: "The plain Yankee of the matter is that the United States wish 
to monopolize to themselves the privilege of colonising ( ... ) every ( ... ) part of the American 
Continent." I 13 
The first successful attempt to enforce the Monroe Doctrine was in 1898, with the intervention 
in Cuba during the revolt against Spain. As a result of the victory, the United States gained 
control over Puerto Rico, Hawaii and the Philippines. Cuba was granted independence, but 
remained a US protectorate until the 1930s. A series of interventions followed thereafter. I 14 In 
1905, an intervention took place in the Dominican Republic to prevent Germany, France and 
Italy from collecting the debt owed to them by the Dominican government. This intervention 
produced the "Roosevelt Corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine, which asserted "the US right to 
109 Literally, the message reads: "The American continents, by the free and independent condition which they 
hdve assumed and maintained, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by 
European powers." In Bingham, Hiram, The Monroe Doctrine, an obsolete shibboleth, [New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 1905] pg.3 
110 The Doctrine states: " ... we could not view any interposition for oppression [Latin American states] or 
controlling in any other manner their destiny by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation 
of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States." Ibid 
III "In the wars of the European powers, in matters relating to themselves, we have never taken any part, nor does 
it comport with our policy so to do." Op. Cit. Bradford, pg. 165 
112 Noticeably, the United States only decided to recognize the most solidly established Latin American regimes 
(Argentina, Chile, Gran Colombia, Mexico, and Peru) once Florida, a Spanish colony, was in its hands. 
113 Op. Cit. Bradford, pg. 160 
114 For example, the United States supported a rebellion in the Colombian province of Panama, which led to 
Panama's independence in 1903. In retum for its aid, the US was conferred all the rights over the Canal Zone, 
and assumed control over Panama's finances and foreign relations. Hence, President Roosevelt's declaration: "I 
took the Isthmus."Op. Cit. Hilarie, pg. 3 
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take over as trustee in bankruptcy the assets of delinquent debtor countries in the hemisphere, 
thereby preventing intervention by European creditors." I 15 As a consequence of the Corollary, 
the United States occupied the Dominican Republic and Haiti. It also established a 
protectorate over Nicaragua, intervened in Mexico, and subsequently intervened in Panama in 
1925. This coercive diplomacy toward Latin America was called the "big stick diplomacy". 
Thus, the Monroe Doctrine substituted European intervention for North American 
intervention. At The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, Latin America tried to force the 
adoption of measures to make certain types of interventions illegal. However, the measures 
were rejected. The ban on intervention appeared once again in the creation of the League of 
Nations, but no mechanism was determined to prevent great powers' intervention in small 
States. The Roosevelt Corollary led to various declarations against intervention from different 
Latin American sectors. The Calvo Clause, for instance, attempted to restrict the use of 
interventions for the settlement of investment disputes or the collection of private debts. Then, 
the Foreign Minister of Argentina, Luis M. Drago, stated in 1907 that the failure of a State to 
meet the payment of its public debt did not purport a right of intervention. This declaration 
became known as the Drago Doctrine, and had great influence on the development of 
intemationallaw with respect to non-intervention. 
The Montevideo Convention, signed in 1933, included an Additional Protocol from 1936 on 
non-intervention. This Convention was the basis for the "Good Neighbour" policy propounded 
for some years by the United States. After the Second World War, the Organization of 
American States (OAS) was created to harmonize the relations between the United States and 
Latin America. Intervention was prohibited both by its Charter and by the Rio Treaty, and was 
reaffirmed by the UN Charter. Notwithstanding, it became inoperative with the outbreak of the 
Cold War. 
Besides the Monroe Doctrine, the United States designed the Truman policy of containment to 
prevent the spread of communism. This policy entailed the use of intervention against any 
115 Ibid, pg. 4 
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threat to US national security. The concept of national security, a priority for the superpowers 
after World War II, supported the use of military, economic and political power in order to 
ensure the survival of the State. Among other measures, it included rallying allies, isolating 
threats, using intelligence services and espionage to collect and protect classified information, 
in short, it entailed the use of covert actions. 
There were opposing views on the use of covert operations as a way of protecting the national 
security against a communist threat in Nicaragua. On the one hand, there were the nationalists 
who accepted any use of secret intelligence agencies in defence of the nation-state. This 
position had been expressed years before in the Doolittle Report to the Hoover Commission in 
the 1950s. It stated: "[ w]e must learn to subvert, sabotage and destroy our enemies by more 
clear, more sophisticated and more effective methods that those used against US.,,116 On the 
other hand, there were those Kantians - Kant posited: "do no evil, though the world shall 
perish" 117 -, who affirmed that the United States "ought to discourage the idea of fighting 
secret wars or even initiating most covert operations (because) when ( ... ) we mine harbours in 
Nicaragua (oo.) we fuzz the difference between ourselves and the Soviet Union (oo.) we make a 
major mistake, and throwaway one of our great assets.,,118 Members of the NSC staff who 
insisted on funding and arming the Contras against Congress' prohibitions clearly assented 
with the former view. 
The concept of national security was thus criticised for blurring the boundary between 
domestic and foreign affairs, and for serving as a justification for neo-colonialism during the 
Cold War period. Any threat to national security justified an intervention, open or clandestine, 
with total disregard for the principles of sovereignty and of non-intervention. In this sense, 
Buzan expressed: "the concept of national security does not lend itself to neat and precise 
formulation. It deals with a wide variety of risks about whose probabilities we have little 
knowledge and of contingencies whose nature we can only dimly perceive.,,119 The use of 
!;u Op. cit. Johnson, pg. 60 
1 \7 Ibid 
118 Ibid, pg 7J 
119 Buzan, B., People, States and fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post - Cold War Era, 
[New York, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994], pg. 16 
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covert operations as a means of protecting the national security poses a similar problem, as it 
is difficult to measure the forces that the secret activities may unleash. For instance, the United 
States never imagined what would become of Iran after aiding the Shah to come into power. 
Likewise, they could not foresee that Osama bin Laden, trained by the CIA to fight against the 
communist-led government of Afghanistan during the Cold War, would become one of United 
States' worst enemies. Thus, apart from erasing the limits between internal and foreign issues, 
national security and the use of covert actions as a tool to defend it presents several risks due 
to the uncertainty of the consequences. In the case of Nicaragua, US activities ultimately 
strengthened the FSNL, and gave it increased legitimacy and support. 
When revolution occurred in Nicaragua, the United States argued that prevention of the spread 
of communism was a matter of "regional security", thus seeking the "regionalization" of the 
conflict through the involvement of other Latin American countries, namely Argentina and 
Venezuela. Yet, the Falklands ("Islas Malvinas" for the Argentinians) war in 1982 led to the 
withdrawal of these countries' assistance. Understandably enough, Argentina felt betrayed by 
US support of Great Britain during the war for the islands. 120 
1 he United States' next strategy was to make the revolutions in Nicaragua and El Salvador a 
Central American problem. This approach brought about an increase of economic aid to 
friendly regimes, i.e. Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica, and the strengthening 
of their military capacities. Along with this aid, the methodology included the implementation 
of covert operations in Nicaragua, and the imposition of economic, military and diplomatic 
sanctions on Cuba. The invasion of Grenada in 1983 helped to emphasize US leadership in the 
region, and to project the image of the anti-communist discourse. 
The "Kissinger Report", which came out in January 1984, made an evaluation and 
recommendations on the Central American crisis. The report suggested a change of strategy in 
Nicaragua: the "passive containment", i.e., the aid to friendly governments and support of 
counter-revolutionary groups, should be replaced by an "active containment" or "low intensity 
120 See Mazzei Geraldine, United States Counterinsurgency Policy in Latin America: its origins. methods and 
effects. [Connecticut, Southern Connecticut State University, 1986] 
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war", which involved more drastic and direct actions against rebels. Accordingly, Nicaraguan 
harbours were mined and infrastructure was blown Up.121 Reagan's determination to support 
the Contras required a hard campaign of legitimization of these counter-revolutionary groups 
in the US Congress. In a speech given on 2 July 1985, he compared the Sandinistas to the 
governments of Iran, Cuba, Libya and North Korea, accusing them of constituting a terrorist 
government. l22 Paradoxically, he ended up financing the Contras with the profits from the 
sales of arms to the regime of the Ayatollah Khomeini, a sponsor of international terrorism, 
according to the United States. 
The judgement of the ICJ on the merits came up at a time when the Iran-Contra affairs were 
being unveiled in the United States, polarizing Congressmen and public opinion against the 
administration. The scandal, however, was legal rather than ethical. Those who opposed the 
policies employed by the United States did not argue that it was wrong to support the Contras, 
or unethical to sell arms to Iran, but that both were kept a secret from Congress and from the 
rest of the executive. The fact that some few officers of the administration attributed 
themselves the power to conduct the main aspects of foreign policy, with total disregard of the 
Congress, was symptomatic of the weaknesses of the Constitution. In Draper's words, 
"The Iran-contra affairs were not an aberration; they were brought on by a long 
process of presidential aggrandizement, congressional fecklessness, and judicial 
connivance. If anything is to be gained from this costly experience, it should be the 
belated realization that this process has put the Constitution in danger.,,123 
Undoubtedly, the United States committed several mistakes throughout the whole process of 
deciding on Nicaragua's affairs, the intervention itself, and the proceedings before the Court. 
But perhaps the greatest legal error was the termination of the declaration of acceptance of the 
jurisdiction of the Court in relation to Central American countries a few days before the filing 
of the application by Nicaragua. Theorists, journalists, politicians and authors in general agree 
121 Lucrecia Lozano and Raul Benitez assert that the doctrine of the War of Low Intensity became official when 
Reagan assumed the presidency of the United States for the second period in January 1985. Op. Cit. Benitez, 
Lozano y Bermudez, pg. 64 
122 Ibid, pg. 68 
123 Op. Cit. Draper, pg. 582 
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in that, with such action, the United States government unequivocally accepted its culpability. 
This gave Nicaragua a political victory, as the attention of the media was immediately drawn 
towards the application, giving it a higher degree of credibility. The lawsuit received 
unimaginable support from all sectors, including the international community. Furthennore, 
right after the first decision of the Court on 10 May 1984, which granted the provisional 
measures requested by Nicaragua, the House of Representatives voted against financial aid to 
the Contras. 
As has already been suggested, perhaps the real significance of the IC], decisions is precisely 
that it propelled the opposition against the United States executive's actions. The judgment on 
the merits against the United States provoked a strong reaction from those who believed in 
legality as an essential pillar of law. Pressure increased for the ceasing of US intervention in 
Nicaragua, and for an urgent change in the course of action. Abram Chayes, the American 
lawyer who represented Nicaragua in the case before the IC], affinned he had accepted the 
case "to hold America to its own best standards,,124, and to "force a change in the debate by 
holding up a mirror to America's face and challenging its image of itself as a law-abiding 
nation proud of its role in creating, supporting and defending the international legal order.,,125 
His strategy worked, at least with regards to Nicaragua, but the IC],s decision did not hinder 
the United States from intervening later again in Panama, in 1989. 
The case of Nicaragua might lead to question the status of the IC] in US politics. Yet the fact 
is that the United States had itself appealed to the Court during President Carter's 
administration to solve a dispute against Iran. Certainly, in 1980 the IC] was asked to declare 
that Iran had infringed the principles of international law, due to the seizure of the US 
Embassy in Tehran. What happened then in the Nicaragua case? While the case against Iran 
was in the US interests, the Nicaragua case was not. .. That was the reason behind US non-
compliance with the Court's decisions. But the US government was not totally indifferent to 
the existence of outstanding legal issues before the IC]. The decision of President George 
124 Op. Cit. Reichler, in 
http://www.fl1e.com/fi les/tbl s4 7Detai Is'Yo5CFi leUpload265%5C76%5CNicaragua WorldCourt200 I.pdf 
125 Ibid, pg. 23 
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H. W. Bush to negotiate an aid package with Violeta Chamorro in exchange for Nicaragua's 
withdrawal of the demand for reparations constituted an understated recognition of the Court's 
authority. 
What was the logic and rationale that guided the US behaviour towards Nicaragua and the 
proceedings before the IC]? The logic was undoubtedly that propounded by Morgenthau's 
realism. 126 According to this theory, the rules for intervention should be deduced "not from the 
abstract principles which are incapable of controlling the actions of governments, but from the 
interests of the nations concerned and from their practice of foreign policy reflecting those 
interests".127 This view proclaims that intervention is just another manifestation of the fact that 
weak States must submit to the power of the strong States. 128 Hence, "intervene we must 
'.vhere our national interest requires it and where our power gives us a chance to succeed".129 
Morgenthau affirmed that the fiascos of the Bay of Pigs, Vietnam, and the Dominican 
Republic were the result of the government's failure to decide whether it was more important 
to succeed in the intervention, or to prevent a loss of prestige by not complying with the 
international legislation on non-intervention. Applying this logic to Nicaragua, realists might 
affirm: had the United States settled upon the former, the Sandinista regime would have been 
overthrown, regardless of the negative reactions from the rest of the world; had it chosen the 
126 Morgenthau's conception of morality is quite problematic, because it postulates a seemingly moral dichotomy, 
distinguishing between moral commands that follow "universal rules", and the requirements of political action as 
two different, and even incompatible ethical levels. Indeed he says: "Both individual and state must judge 
political action by universal moral principles, such as that of liberty. Yet, while the individual has a moral right to 
sacrifice himself in defence of such moral principle, the state has no right to let its moral disapprobation of the 
inflingement of liberty get in the way of successful political action, itself inspired by the moral principle of 
national survival". Thus, on the one hand, he recognizes the existence of abstract moral laws that govern the 
universe, and that must be followed by individuals in their private life, and on the other, he contends that political 
"morality" does not observe those universal moral laws, as it is guided by national interest. Morgenthau's realism 
denies the "universal" character of moral law, by proposing another type of morality, the political, that must be 
observed by decision-makers. Morgenthau, Hans, Politics among Nations, the Struggle for Power and Peace, 
[New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1973] pg. 10 
127 Op. Cit. Morgenthau, "To Intervene or not to Intervene", pg. 429 
128 See Little, Richard, Intervention - External Involvement in Civil Wars, [New Jersey, Rowman and Littlefield, 
1975] 
129 Op. Cit. Morgenthau, "To intervene or not to intervene", pg. 436 
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latter, it would have definitely refrained from intervening altogether. Philip Nel has soundly 
called this attitude "cyniC".130 
Many authors agree that the foreign policy of the United States amounts to an ideology of 
national interest,131 which sees as inevitable the involvement in the security and stability of the 
whole world. Whether the defeat of communism, the need to fight drugs, the war against 
terrorism, or the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, some justification can be found to 
intervene in the internal affairs of other States. Ultimately, it all comes down to one single 
argument: the defence of US interests. In this sense, "threats to American operations overseas 
( ... ) are naturally taken seriously by the US government".132 From Theodore Roosevelt to 
George W. Bush, all US presidents have shared the hegemonic belief that the United States 
has both "the right and the might" to control internal events all over the world regardless of 
international law and national sovereignty. 133 
But, is the notion of national interest a moral concept at all? David Welch opines that the 
notion of "national interest" is void, for it is useless both as analytical tool and as guide to 
foreign policy making. 134 The concept provides nothing but indeterminate policy guidance, 
and it is fallacious because it hides whose interest it actually denotes. It masks which values 
130 Nel, Philip, "Morality and Ethics in Intemational Relations", Power, Wealth and Global Eguity, [Juta 
Academic, 2006], pg 44 
131 According to Melvin Gurtov, the ideology of the national interest is founded in three main tenets: a) the United 
States' domestic tranquillity depends on the security and stability overseas; b) the security and stability of the 
"forces offreedom" depend on the United States' willingness to carry out its mission and responsibilities; c) the 
United States can only achieve its mission and security responsibilities as long as it has its ability to intervene in 
the intemal affairs of other peoples. Op. Cit. Gurtov, pg. 5 
132 Girling, lohn, America and the Third World, Revolution and Intervention, [London, Routledge &Reagan Paul 
Ltd., 1980]pg. 139 
133 Kombluh, Peter, "Nicaragua", in Op. Cit. Schraeder, pg.235 
134 One stream of thought, represented by George Kennan, has said there is no necessary relation between 
national interest and morality. Realists, represented by Morgenthau, believe that what is in the national interest is 
the moral thing to do, consequently, the national interest is a moral concept in itself. For others, although morality 
and national interest are different in the logical and theoretical sphere, they coincide in the practice, as for 
Woodrow Wilson, who thought that "in the long run the best way of securing peace and prosperity is always to 
seek to do what is right". Finally, there are those, like Reinhold Niebuhr and Stanley Hoffman, who sustain that, 
although the national interest is a concept with moral content, a foreign policy based in the national interest can 
easily fail the test of morality. In this sense, "there are times when a diligent pursuit of one's own country's 
security or welfare would contravene higher moral duties." In Welch, David, "Morality and the 'National 
Interest', in Valls, Andrew, Ethics in Intemational Affairs, [New York, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, inc., 
2000] pg. 3 
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are being promoted by statesmen, and which are being sacrificed. 135 In this sense, the idea of 
national interest "prevents us from acknowledging the role that morality plays in foreign 
policy - in both our own foreign policy and that of other States. This masking effect makes it 
more difficult for States to pursue moral goals and also represents a permissive cause of 
international conflict".136 
The problem with US foreign policy, according to Samuel Huntington, is that there is a gap 
between the ideals in which North Americans believe, and the institutions that embody their 
practice. He contends that institutions that handle foreign policy have functional imperatives 
that conflict with the liberal-democratic values of what he calls the "American Creed". This, 
he argues, has led to "the contradiction between enhancing liberty at home by curbing the 
power of the American government and enhancing liberty abroad by expanding that 
power.,,137 The Iran-Contra affair could certainly be understood within this framework. It 
could be argued that the attempts of the Congress of restricting the executive's power in 
relation to covert actions, and the stubbornness of the executive of supporting the Contras, 
even if it meant the disregard of the Congressional mandate, gave rise to the conflict. 
Whether it is a problem of the application of realism, the void of the notion of national 
interest, or the gap between ideals and institutions, the truth is that the United States follows a 
logic that collides with the principles laid by international law, and that this is increasingly 
leading the world towards more and more anti-American sentiments. 
Nicaragua 
It has been said that what makes this case unique are not the facts themselves, but rather 
Nicaragua's decision to take the conflict to the IC}, and the impact the Court's decision had in 
135 Ibid, pg, 4 
136 Ibid, pg. 9 
137 Huntington, Samuel P., "American Ideals versus American Institutions", in Ikenberry, John, American 
Foreign Policy, [New York, Harper Collins Publishers, 1989] pg. 255 
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international law. Certainly, the intervention in Nicaragua raised several questions of law and 
politics. In adjudging the case, the Tribunal had to clarify the scope of the principles of non-
intervention and non-use of force, the use of the right of collective self-defence and the right 
to resort to counter-measures. The decision to hear the case had a high political impact, 
because the IC] took on the task of examining US foreign and national security policies, in a 
region that had, until then, been considered of total US influence. For the first time in the 
history of the IC], the Court was asked to decide upon an ongoing armed conflict between the 
United States and a Latin American country. Moreover, it was the first time that the Court was 
invited to hear a case against the United States. 
Yet, the importance of Nicaragua's step of trusting the matter to the IC] does not take from the 
fact that the lawsuit also served several practical purposes. The Sandinistas used the years of 
the proceedings before the Court to gain military superiority. The lawsuit prevented a direct 
military intervention similar to the one performed in Grenada, stopped the funding of the 
Contras by changing the minds of US Congressmen, and appeased the internal political 
atmosphere in Nicaragua after the Sandinista revolution. Although the Contras continued their 
attacks, the Sandinistas had the capabilities to endure them, thanks to the provisional measures 
ordered by the Court, and the weakening of the support given to rebel groups by the US 
Congress. 
The Sandinistas' support to the guerrillas in other Central American countries was 
undisputable. They had facilitated the unification of several guerrilla groups in Guatemala, 138 
and had supported the creation of several insurgent groups in Honduras. Daniel Ortega himself 
avowed before to Court to have known about arms shipments directed to the insurgents in El 
Salvador. 139 Hence, a judgment of the IC] in favour of Nicaragua's pleadings somehow 
cleaned all these records, and gave further legitimacy to the Sandinistas at the international 
level. The application shifted the centre of discussion from the usual question of whether the 
138 Nicaragua had helped the insurgents in Guatemala to the extent that the declaration of unity was signed in 
Managua in 1980. 
139 See Castillo, Donald, Gringos, Contras y Sandinistas, [Bogota, TM Editores, 1993] pg. 253 - 255 
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Sandinistas were a communist movement that threatened US security, to whether US interests 
were served by funding the Contras against domestic and internationallaw.!40 
According to the lawyers retained by Nicaragua, the vision of the Sandinista government as 
radical, communist, and allied of the Soviet Union and Cuba was a manipulation of Reagan's 
administration to justify its actions. Nicaragua, they contend, only requested the aid of the 
Soviets when the Sandinistas realized they could not fight the United States by themselves. 
Peter Schraeder agrees with this view when he points out: "US paramilitary support for the 
contras has forced the Sandinistas to rely more heavily on Cuban and Soviet support and 
advisers, the exact opposite of US foreign policy objectives in the region.,,!4! 
Conversely, other authors stress the geo-strategic importance of Nicaragua for the Soviet 
Union, finding some reason in US actions. Donald Castillo, for instance, argues that the airport 
of Punta Huete was especially adapted by the Soviets for MIG Soviet planes to make military 
manoeuvres, as well as some harbours in the Pacific coast of Nicaragua, which had access to 
the American coasts of California.!42 These facts indicate that the United States had reasons to 
fear that Nicaragua would become a second Cuba, with the dangers of another missiles crisis 
like the one that occurred in 1962. 
Nicaragua's lawyers played a central role in convincing the Sandinistas that in order to have a 
favourable decision from the ICl, they needed to suspend any aid to the El Salvador 
insurgency, avoid restrictions on the civil liberties of Nicaraguan citizens, and implement a 
democratic government as soon as possible. These actions, they assured, would be 
fundamental to have the judges' sympathy, and to gain the votes they needed in the US 
Congress. The Sandinistas were therefore not free of some degree of opportunism and self-
\40 When the application before the Court was filed in 1983 the aid to the Contras had significant support from 
the United States Congress. The Nicaraguan government had looked for solutions at the multilateral and bilateral 
levels: multilaterally, it had declared its support to the Contadora Process, an attempt to appease Central America 
and the relations between Nicaragua and the United States; bilaterally, it had proposed solutions to reach peace 
between both parties. However, these endeavours had failed. The United States government had no interest in 
those peace initiatives. 
\4\ Op. Cit. Schraeder, pg. 128 
\42 Op. Cit. Castillo, pg. 250 
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interested aims in following the course of actions they did. But even if the immediate motives 
underlying Nicaragua's lawsuit were not inspired in the highest moral imperatives of respect 
of international law, it is undeniable that the lawsuit had great impact on the way interventions 
have been perceived thereafter in international law. 
Honduras, Costa Rica and El Salvador 
The attitude of Nicaragua's neighbours cannot be left aside when assessing the development 
of the case. Naturally, most criticisms devolve upon the United States, because of the visibility 
of its errors and its negligence in assuming the judicial decisions of the IC}. Nonetheless, 
Honduras, Costa Rica and El Salvador are not free of guilt. Honduras decisively supported 
both the United States and the Contras. It participated in neighbouring conflicts carrying out 
joint operations with the Salvadorian army, sometimes engaging in combat inside El Salvador, 
and allowing a massive US military build-up on its territory in order to perform covert 
activities in Nicaragua. 143 Honduras was perhaps the most decisive ally of the United States 
and the right-wing movements in Central America. 
Likewise, Costa Rica and El Salvador took the chance to benefit from the conflict in 
Nicaragua. Their alignment with the United States granted them a great deal of economic aid, 
and they certainly cooperated in the performance of the covert actions. Costa Rica not only 
provided its territory for the operation of one of the Contras' fronts, but also established an 
airstrip for their supply. This airstrip was closed down by Oscar Arias when he came to power. 
El Salvador, on the other hand, was critical for the little defence the United States presented to 
the Court, as it alleged it had been attacked by the Sandinistas. Thus, the United States was not 
alone in its determination to undermine the Sandinista government. It had key allies in the 
quest to eliminate any seeds of communism in the region. 
143 Berryman, Phillip, Inside Central America, [New York, Pantheon Books, 1985] pg. 88 
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International Court of Justice 
The judgment of 27 June 1986 has shortcomings, as well as highly positive aspects. On the 
one hand, the Court made the effort to respect the principle of equality of the parties to the 
dispute, by analysing, not only the claims adduced by the United States in its counter-
memorial on jurisdiction and admissibility, i.e., collective self-defence, but also the possibility 
of counter-measures as a response to Nicaragua's actions, even though the United States never 
appealed to this justification. Nonetheless, the evaluation of the evidence, as well as the 
reasons asserted to declare the violation of the principles of international law, seem sometimes 
biased in favour of Nicaragua. 
For instance, as explained before, the Court dismissed the justification of collective self-
defence based on formalities, that is, the absence of the declarations by Honduras, Costa Rica 
and EI Salvador of being under armed attack, and the absence of a request of help to the 
United States by Honduras and Costa Rica. The fact that Nicaragua accepted to have given 
support to the insurgents in EI Salvador was hardly taken into account by the Tribunal. 
Similarly, the trans-border military incursions into the territories of Honduras and Costa Rica, 
and their imputability to Nicaragua, were events almost ignored by the ICJ, arguing that the 
evidence available did not prove that these actions amounted to an armed attack. 
The contentions on the lack of conditions for the exercise of collective self-defence, and the 
consequent unlawful use of force, reflect directly on the arguments regarding non-
intervention, since the case had to do with intervention involving the use of force. The ICJ 
noted that the OAS Charter includes a principle according to which "an act of aggression 
against one American State is an act of aggression against all the other American States." 
Furthermore, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance establishes: 
"[a]n armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as 
an attack against all the American States and, consequently, each one of the said 
Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in exercise of the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence ... " 144 
144 Op. Cit. Decision of the IC] of 27 June 1986, pg. 104 
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However, the IC] never considered these instruments as constituting enough grounds for the 
exercise of collective counter-measures, which could have been manifested in the economic 
measures taken by the United States against Nicaragua. On the contrary, the Court insisted on 
the need for the request of the State directly attacked as a condition for the exercise of 
collective self-defence, and on the fact the United States was not the aggrieved State and, 
therefore, it could not lawfully take counter-measures on behalf of EI Salvador, Honduras and 
Costa Rica. 
Besides these substantive flaws, the decision was criticised because even though the Court was 
legally bound to rule over the facts stated in the grievances, it decided over facts that occurred 
after the lawsuit was presented, such as the commercial embargo on Nicaragua's products 
declared in May 1985. 145 Arguably, the Court's position is not surprising in view of the 
attitude assumed by the United States after the first judgement had been given adverse to its 
allegations. The US stance was offensive not only towards Nicaragua, but also towards the 
IC]. 
It is noticeable that despite the fact that the United States was not represented in the 
proceedings, judge Schwebel took the role of confronting Nicaragua's lawyers and cross-
examining witnesses. In his Dissenting Opinion, he asserted that the Court was mistaken in its 
approach to Article 51 of the UN Charter, in the sense that the right of self-defence can only 
be exercised "if, and only if, an armed attack occurS.,,146 In his viewpoint, although Article 51 
only highlights one form of self-defence, this does not negate other patterns of legitimate 
action in self-defence, for example, in case of preventive war. 
As to the aspects worth highlighting, it is compelling to point out, in the first place, the fact 
that the Court recognized that the principles of international law exist independently from the 
instruments that include them, thus recognizing they have a separate applicability from treaty-
145 See Hoyos, Felix, La Corte Intemacional de la Haya y el Litigio Nicaragua contra Estados Unidos, [Bogota, 
Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 1991] 
146 Op. Cit. Dinstein, pg. 185 
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law. This statement is fundamental, because it extends the scope of applicability of 
international law and its principles to cases where treaty-law is in fact inapplicable. According 
to the Court, the general principles of law have acquired their status through the practice of 
international relations, and they are an integral part of international law. Consequently, the 
principles are enough grounds for the IC] to be competent to entertain a dispute in case they 
have been contravened. In this sense: 
"The fact that the abovementioned principles, recognized as such, have been 
codified or embodied in multilateral conventions does not mean that they cease to 
exist and to apply as principles of customary law, even as regards countries that 
are parties to such conventions. Principles such as those of the non-use of force, 
non-intervention, respect for the independence and territorial integrity of 
States, and freedom of navigation, continue to be binding as part of 
customary law, despite the operation of provisions of conventional law in 
which they have been incorporated.,,]47 
This means that no State can escape from observing the principles. Customary international 
law is to be obeyed independently from the significance that Conventions, Declarations and 
Treaties that include them might have in a particular case. 
Secondly, in spite of the deficiencies of the judgements, the Court made justice. If US actions 
had been actually guided by the altruistic aim of aiding other Central American countries 
against unjustified aggression, the Court's decision would certainly be highly questionable. 
Notwithstanding, it is clear that the United States was primarily guided by self-interest. Hence, 
its activities in and against Nicaragua were inexcusable. Following the ICJ's contentions, the 
support given by Nicaragua to other Central American guerrillas could have been halted by 
blocking the flow of arms to neighbouring countries. Arming and training the Contras, as well 
as mining ports and blowing up infrastructure, were neither necessary nor proportionate to that 
purpose. These activities only proved that US intentions were to overthrow Nicaragua's 
government. 
147 Op. Cit. Decision of the ICJ of 27 June 1986, pg. 93. The highlight is ours. 
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Accordingly, Nicaragua won on all issues by margins ranging from 12-3 to 14-1. The Court 
overwhelmingly rejected US arguments, condemned all forms of support for the Contras (12-
3), the direct attacks on Nicaraguan infrastructure (12-3), and the mining of ports (14-1), 
found that the production and distribution of the manual "Psychological Operations in 
Guerrilla Warfare" encouraged the Contras to commit acts contrary to general principles of 
humanitarian law (14-1); and it ordered the United States to pay reparations to Nicaragua for 
all injuries caused by its violations of customary international law (12-3) and the bilateral 
treaty (14_1).148 
Although the United States did not abide by the Court's decision, the Judgment was certainly 
pivotal in stopping the aid to the Contras, and in creating the climate for the development of 
negotiations which concluded with a peace agreement in Central America. In this sense, the 
Court's judgments set off a chain reaction that "helped convince the Congress to cut off 
funding for the Contras, gave Nicaragua the respite it needed to turn the tide of battle, and 
forced the White House into egregious tactical errors that ultimately undid its entire policy.,,149 
Those tactical errors were the continuance of the support to the Contras through third 
countries, private funds, and the profits from the sale of arms to Iran. 
There were those who criticized Nicaragua's lawsuit arguing that it had only put the Court on 
the spot, making its weaknesses evident. Thus, they claimed: "When superpowers and their 
vital interests are involved ( ... ), 'judicial pusillanimity' is called for." 150 In other words, they 
felt there was no doubt that a superpower like the United States would continue to pursue a 
foreign policy considered vital to its national interests, despite the ruling of the ICJ, which had 
no means of enforcement. This argument is nothing but absurd, since the very nature and 
purpose of the ICJ is precisely to provide the space where States can solve their disputes on 
equal conditions. Indeed, "it is only in the Hague that Nicaragua can face the United States 
148 Op. Cit. Richler, pg. 43 
149 Ibid, pg. 35 
150 Ibid, pg. 39 
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on equal terms. It is the only forum where the outcome is not predetermined by the disparities 
of military and economic power between the parties.,,151 
With relation to ethics, the stress put by the Court on the superiority of the principles of 
international law over treaty and domestic law shows traces of natural law thinking and 
idealism. 152 These streams of thought are characterized by the conviction that the same code of 
morality applies for individuals and States. For idealists, the pursuit of good is a matter of 
right reasoning. Ethical values have universal validity, and therefore, they transcend moral 
practices of particular communities, depending mainly on reason. In the same line of thought, 
the Court's contentions create the ground for a set of values established by international law, 
and highlight the necessity to comply with rules independent from the political situation and 
contingent needs of particular historical moments. 
It is not surprising that the Court upholds this viewpoint. The defence of international law and 
its principles is, ultimately, a vindication of the values that have been considered reasonable 
and desirable in the ambit of the "ought to be n. Thus, the fundamental principles established 
in the different international instruments (the UN Charter, the Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of 
Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and 
Sovereignty, the Declaration on Principles of International Law, Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation, the Geneva Conventions, among others) are believed to have universal 
application, and the IC] obviously advocates for their compliance and respect. 
Consequently, the ethics propounded by the IC] collides with the moral theory that guides US 
fureign policy. While the former promotes the need to obey the universal values set out by 
international law, the latter pursues its self-interests, whether or not they coincide with 
151 Ibid. Highlight is ours. 
152 Kant, with his essay Perpetual Peace, was particularly influential to this stream of thought in the aftermath of 
World War I, as it inspired Woodrow Wilson's fourteen points, and the creation the League of Nations. 
According to Kant, states are moral entities urged to take all the necessary measures for the achievement of 
peace, including, among other things, refraining from secretly instigating rebellions, and interfering by force in 
another state. Kant, Immanuel, Pemetual Peace, [New York, Columbia University Press, 1939], pg. 6 
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international rules. As Johnson puts it, "the debate continues between realists and moralists 
over the proper balance between protecting the nation's interests abroad and maintaining its 
virtue. ( ... ) Yet the influence of the moralist perspective in the United States should not be 
overestimated." 153 
The decision of the ICJ in the case of Nicaragua is still significant in terms of both law and 
politics. In terms of law, the Court clarified the scope of individual and collective self-defence, 
and of the principles of non-intervention and non-use of force. Also, the judgment gave a new 
meaning to self-defence by qualifying it as an "inherent right". In so doing, it extended its 
applicability from UN Member States to all States, even if they are not members of the UN, 
since "the existence of the right of self-defence under general customary international law 
denotes that it is conferred on every State." 154 In terms of politics, the examination of US 
foreign policy by an international institution, and its condemnation, is a demonstration that 
when it comes to law, all States are equal, no matter their power or status in the international 
community. 
In short, the United States clearly violated the principle of non-intervention by undertaking 
military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua. None of the possible justifying 
causes applied to its conduct, neither regarding the rule of non-intervention, nor the principle 
of non-use of force. The Monroe Doctrine ("America for the Americans"), and the Doctrine of 
Containment of communism have served as grounds for the United States to carry out a series 
of interventions throughout Latin America ever since independence from European empires 
was proclaimed. Some of these interventions have been direct, others indirect, through the use 
of covert operations. 
The use of covert operations as a way to protect national security has been highly 
controversial, generating the well-known debate between realists and idealists or moralists. 
Realists defend intervention wherever national interest requires it and when there are chances 
of succeeding, whereas moralists support the superiority of international law and condemn the 
153 Op. Cit. Johnson, pg. 139 
154 Op. Cit. Dinstein, pg. 182 
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use of covert operations whenever it purports the violation of the rule of non-intervention. In 
practical terms, covert operations are risky because their consequences are difficult to 
anticipate. In this particular case, the debate around covert actions arose due to the secrecy 
with which the executive handled Iran-Contra affairs. The fact that members of the National 
Security Staff acted secretly in violation of Congress' prohibitions made Nicaragua's claims 
stronger. In addition, the US refusal to participate in the merits phase of the proceedings 
turned the tide in favour of Nicaragua's demands. 
The United States has guided its foreign policy based on notions where the contents are 
difficult to pin down. National security, national interest, and covert operations are all 
concepts hard to define and open to many interpretations. At the end of the day they allow for 
intervention and for the use of force whenever it appears necessary. This case is especially 
interesting precisely because US foreign policy was questioned by the ICl, and it gave the 
Court the opportunity to clarify the scope of the principles of non-intervention and non-use of 
force, the use of the right of collective self-defence and the right to resort to counter-measures. 
Although Nicaragua had been in fact aiding insurgent movements in other Central American 
countries, the judgments practically ignored this piece of evidence and decided in favour of 
the Applicant State. The attitude of the United Stated must have had a lot to do with the 
hardening of the IC], s position. The Court used the ambiguity of the definition of armed attack 
to dismiss the contention that there had been trans-border military incursions into the 
territories of Honduras and Costa Rica by the Nicaraguan government. Likewise, it overlooked 
the fact that Nicaragua had been giving arms to the Salvadorian insurgents. The possibility 
that the economic sanctions imposed by the United States on Nicaragua could have been taken 
on the basis of the principle of the OAS Charter according to which "an act of aggression 
against one American State is an act of aggression against all the other American States" was 
also discarded by the ICl. The absence of a request by the aggrieved States as a condition for 
the exercise of collective self-defence, and the fact that the United States was not itself the 
aggrieved State were the basis for this decision. The role Honduras, Costa Rica and EI 
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Salvador played in supporting the US intervention cannot be underestimated, for without their 
aid, the United States could not have carried out covert activities in Nicaragua. 
Notwithstanding, the judgments became a landmark in international law due to their treatment 
of the principles of non-use of force and non-intervention. The Court recognized that the 
principles of international law exist independently from the instruments where they are 
established, thus allowing for their autonomous application. Moreover, the decisions 
demonstrated that the legal realm provides a space, perhaps the only one, where all States can 
be equal, despite their differences in power. The idealistic view held by the Court collides with 
the realism defended by the United States. Each of them reflects a distinct ethical paradigm of 
international relations. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
In the conclusions, we must address the questions posed as criteria of judgment to guide the 
analysis of the case. The judgments of the IC] are not shielded against criticisms and free of 
flaws. Not only the decisions ruled over facts that occurred after the lawsuit was presented, but 
they reveal some argumentative deficiencies, such as the puzzling conception of "armed 
attack", the insufficient weight given to the evidence against Nicaragua, and the lack of 
examination on economic sanctions as possible collective counter-measures. 
Nevertheless, these shortcomings do not undermine the legitimacy and validity of the 
judgements for several reasons. The IC] is an institution of international law. As such, its 
decisions are framed within the principle of legality, according to which the decisions taken by 
legitimate authorities are legal, unless proven otherwise. If they are legal, they are compulsory 
and, consequently, they should be obeyed by international actors. The lack of a unified system 
of law, an organized administration of sanctions, and tribunals with compulsory jurisdiction, 
makes the system of international law quite vulnerable to the will of the strongest States. 
However, the fact that international law does not have the support of a system of sanctions 
does not imply that it is not a proper system of law. Some authors affirm that international law 
is a "horizontal legal system", constituted by formally equal participants, as opposed to a 
"vertical legal system", represented by the hierarchical arrangement of norms enforced by an 
institutional hierarchy.155 In the decentralized international system, the conduct of States and 
international actors in accordance with international rules is compulsory, even if there is no 
way to make it enforceable. Any deviation, including the disobedience of an ICJ's judgment, 
constitutes an infringement of international law and is, therefore, reproachable by the 
international community. 
It is noteworthy that, for most of its part, the IC] has been successful in terms of compliance 
with its decisions. 156 Only three cases stand out as cases of non-compliance: the Corfu 
1550p. Cit. Little, pg. 20 
156 Hathaway, Oona, "Is Intemationallaw Useful?", in 
http://ww w .Iegalaffairs.orglwebexc lusi ve/dcbateclub intlO I 05 .msp 
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Channel Case 157, the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran 158, and our case in 
point: Nicaragua v. the United States. The importance of the IC] lies not only in its judicial 
function, but also in its legislative contributions to international law. In deciding on cases, the 
Court has greatly shaped international law and its principles. Although technically a ruling of 
the IC] is only binding between the parties, the ICrs decisions have been treated as binding 
for al1. 159 Thus, even though the IC] does not prevent international conflict, it at least provides 
a forum for the peaceful resolution of disputes between States on equal terms. The case of 
Nicaragua is a remarkable example of this assertion. 
Further, the legitimacy of the judgment can be defended on the grounds of justice. The 
intervention of the United States in Nicaragua was indeed illegal, because it constituted a 
direct, coercive, forcible and clandestine interference in Nicaragua's internal affairs. None of 
the exceptions to the principle of non-intervention were applicable to the case, not even 
collective self-defence or the right to resort to counter-measures. Nicaragua, as well as other 
Central American countries, namely EI Salvador, had gone through long years of a US-
supported repressive regime, and it was their right to go through revolutionary processes that 
would help them achieve autonomy and freedom. Far from being inspired by philanthropic 
ideals, US actions in and against Nicaragua were guided by self-interested aims. Having 
another communist regime in its "backyard" (besides Cuba) was certainly not desirable. In 
order to prevent it, the United States used all the means available, regardless of their legality 
and moral righteousness. In view of these facts, the Court enhanced the principles of 
sovereignty, self-determination, non-use of force and non-intervention in the domestic affairs 
of States. 
157 This case arose from a lawsuit filed by Great Britain against Albania in 1946, as two British destroyers struck 
land mines off of Albania. The ICJ ruled in favour of Great Britain, but Albania refused to pay the compensation 
that was ordered, until 1996, when it agreed to the terms set out by the Court. 
158 In this case, the United States filed a suit against Iran due to the abduction of the American embassy personnel 
in Tehran. The Court ruled for the United States, but Iran did not comply immediately with the decision. Only in 
the long run, the two countries reached an agreement on the return of the hostages and for a settlement regarding 
US freezing of Iranian assets. 
159 See http://Jawofnations.blogspot.com!200SI06/reconsidering-reconsideratioll-of-icj.htmlm 
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The arguments used to rule the Nicaragua case have permanent validity and application, 
despite the fact that they were stated during the Cold War. Customary international rules and 
principles remain pillars of international law. Moreover, the Court's arguments helped clarify 
the meaning and status of the principles of non-intervention and non-use of force, as well as 
the scope of the right of collective self-defence and the right to resort to counter-measures in 
response to a wrongful act by another State. Thus, they stand, and will stand, until the practice 
and opinio juris of States and international actors prove otherwise. 
The general rule of non-intervention in the internal affairs of States is, therefore, a 
fundamental tenet in international law. Yet, the assessment of an intervention will most 
probably demand the examination of possible justifying causes, before it can be labelled as 
illegal. This is all the more evident in interventions that involve the use of force, as the first 
thing that needs to be clarified is whether the intervention was done on the grounds of 
individual or collective self-defence, or on the basis of the right to take counter-measures. Of 
course, as has been explained, the actions that involve the use of force fall outside the scope of 
counter-measures. However, as the expression states, an intervention that involves the use of 
force might have other non-forcible actions which might be covered by the right to resort to 
counter-measures, and hence, be justified. 
In the case of Nicaragua, the motives and doctrines underlying US activities made all the 
actions indefensible. The Monroe Doctrine and the Truman Doctrine of Containment, in 
particular, are declarations of intervention in the States of the American continent that are 
blatantly opposed to the principle of non-intervention. The case in point is just one example of 
the fact that whenever US vital interests are at stake, it will most likely invoke void or illegal 
concepts - i.e. the Monroe Doctrine, the Roosevelt Corollary, the Truman Doctrine of 
Containment, national security or national interest, "war on drugs", "war on terror", etc. - to 
justify unlawful interventions. 
Phillip Berryman made the following comment about the possible upcommg military 
intervention of the United States in Nicaragua in 1985, as chances of intervention were 
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mounting: " ... it is hard to imagine how any government installed under the US occupation 
army could attain legitimacy, even through 'free elections'. Before undertaking an invasion of 
Nicaragua, policymakers should ask themselves not only how the United States could occupy 
Nicaragua but, more importantly, how it could leave. ,,160 Berryman's appraisal definitely 
brings us back to the present situation in Iraq. 
One of the main problems concerning intervention by the United States is that this superpower 
follows a paradigm (realism) that collides with that of international law (idealism). The 
defence at all costs of national interest undermines the applicability of the concepts of 
sovereignty, self-determination, and non-intervention. While weak States usually see 
interventions in their internal affairs as an abuse and a disrespect of their autonomy, US public 
opinion and even some scholars conceive intervention as righteous, on the grounds that the 
values of liberty and democracy have universal application and must be, therefore, imposed in 
other societies. Samuel Huntington, for instance, is persuaded that the lack of US intervention 
is what brought dictators to Latin America in the years following the 1930s. In this sense, he 
affirms: 
"[ d]irect intervention by the American government in Central America and the 
Caribbean came to at least a temporary end in the early 1930. Without exception 
the result was a shift in the direction of more dictatorial regimes. ( ... ) When 
A " . d d d d d ,,161 mencan mterventIOn en e , emocracy en e . 
What Huntington seems to forget is that interventions carried out before the 1930s, namely 
those under the Roosevelt Corollary, aimed at taking over the assets of debtor countries to 
prevent Europe from appropriating them, and not at promoting democracy in the region. 
Moreover, dictators were largely supported by the United States during the era of the "Good 
Neighbour" doctrine, precisely because they served US interests. 
lh~Op. Cit. Berryman, pg. 87 
161 Op. Cit. Huntington, pg. 248 
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As reproachable as US doctrines and attitudes might be, it would be unfair not to acknowledge 
that Nicaragua, Honduras, Costa Rica and EI Salvador were guided by selfish motivations as 
well. The measures taken by Nicaragua in order to have a favourable decision from the Court 
were hypocritical and deceitful, as they were only adopted to win the case. Honduras, in tum, 
played a decisive role in US support to the Contras. Without Honduras' assistance, the United 
States could have not carried out covert actions. Similarly, Costa Rica and EI Salvador 
benefited from the conflict in Nicaragua, obtaining economic aid in exchange for their 
alignment with the United States. Costa Rica provided its territory for the operation of the 
ARDE, even establishing an airstrip for their supply. EI Salvador, on the other hand, was a US 
ally to the extent that it alleged that it had been under attack by the Sandinistas. Consequently, 
the United States had great support in its quest to undermine the Nicaraguan government, and 
to eradicate communism from its "backyard". 
The main concern underlying the topic of the principle of non-intervention is to ascertain the 
role it really plays in international relations, and whether the practice has rendered it a merely 
nominal, obsolete or decorative figure in international law. To answer this problem, we only 
need to tum to the general practice of States and international actors, and to their attitude 
towards the principle and violations to it. Are they indifferent or do they, on the contrary, 
approve and agree to uphold them? The analysis of the case of Nicaragua, its implications, and 
the reactions it produced show that the concept of sovereignty, the grounds from where the 
principle of non-intervention ultimately stems, continues to be fundamental. Therefore, the 
proscription of intervention remains vital in the normative structure on which international 
order depends. 
Based on the foregoing, it is sensible to construe that the repeated violations of the norm of 
non-intervention have not led to an erosion of the principle's authority and legitimacy. The 
world continues to uphold the ban on intervention enshrined in the UN Charter and other 
regional declarations and resolutions as a fundamental principle of international law. As the 
Court stated, "principles such as those of the non-use of force, non-intervention, respect for 
the independence and territorial integrity of States, and freedom of navigation, continue to be 
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binding as part of customary law.,,162 Instead of changing the customary law, US violations 
have given added relevance to the importance of the norm of non-intervention in international 
relations. 163 The justification of intervention that proceeds from a supposed right of States to 
do whatever is necessary to preserve self-interests is inherently destructive of international 
peace and security.164 To conclude, we will borrow Hedley Bull's words: "if there is a way 
forward now, it lies not in seeking to replace the rule of non-intervention with some other rule, 
but rather in considering how it should be adapted to meet the particular circumstances and 
needs of the present time." 165 
162 Op. Cit. Decision of the IC] of 26 November 1984, pg. 424 
163 Op. Cit. Hilarie, pg. 21 
164 Op. Cit. Bull, pg.190 
165 Ibid, pg. 187 
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